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The story of American cities is usually told as the story of progressive
waves of immigrants, establishing neighborhoods, and adding to the texture of
the overall fabric of the city. Since World War II, however, the trend in cities
has been one of shrinking population, increased minority (primarily African-
American) population in the center city and a circle of wealthier, whiter sub-
urbs on the fringes or outside the city. The modem American city is defined as
much by who left as by who stayed. The result is a city which is often segre-
gated, hampered by a weak tax and job base, and characterized by an older and
less well-maintained housing stock than the suburbs.
While each city has its own unique history and texture, many of the trends
leading to segregated, impoverished cities are common. These trends are
based not only on population movements, but on federal, state and local poli-
cies that make the resulting segregated city all but inevitable. In this paper, I
examine New Haven, Connecticut as a model, in the belief that the trends con-
cerning segregation, housing policy and poverty are applicable throughout
many, if not most, American cities.
New Haven is old enough to have been affected by both early and recent
immigration. It is a city of neighborhoods serving as a microcosm for larger
cities. It is surrounded by a ring of whiter, wealthier suburbs. It had and lost a
strong industrial base. Most importantly, it has served as a laboratory for vir-
tually every twentieth century social policy experiment, by both the public and
private sector.
The purpose of this paper is to examine New Haven's history so that we
t Editor's Note: Due to the age of some newspaper articles appearing in this piece, some
citations are incomplete. We have tried to provide the reader with as much information as
available.
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can avoid repeating it. As a result of this study, I believe that we can identify
some of our past (and continuing) errors:
1. Urban housing policy has overemphasized integration as a goal, at the
expense of preserving neighborhoods regardless of race. Policy makers, in-
cluding progressives doing their best to preserve cities, failed to perceive the
possibility that a predominantly black neighborhood could be as stable as a
white or integrated neighborhood. As a result, urban renewal became a means
to raze deteriorating neighborhoods, we forced middle and upper class blacks
to leave the city in order to find high quality housing and schools.
2. Urban policy has been determined by a top-down system, with little or
no input from people who live in neighborhoods. A tenant's or homeowner's
stake in the community has been seen as insufficient expertise to warrant in-
volvement in the decision-making process. Historically, this exclusionary
process has been largely cultural, with only white, male business and govern-
mental leaders qualified to set policy. This is particularly true in low-income,
predominantly black neighborhoods.
3. Mobility programs are potentially disastrous for shrinking cities. In
many low-income neighborhoods, Section 8 subsidies support high-end rents.
New vacancies created by mobility programs are unlikely to be filled at the
same rent level and may remain vacant, resulting in an increase in abandoned
buildings. To avoid this consequence, mobility programs must include provi-
sion for neighborhood revitalization.
4. Legal services rhetoric claims a philosophic foundation of representing
community interests, but legal services providers have concentrated on indi-
vidual rights, often at the expense of the community. Through a priority set-
ting which largely excludes community, legal services providers have mirrored
governmental policy makers in a top-down decision making process. The re-
sult is a caseload in which neighborhood concerns are irrelevant, with legal
services attorneys "winning" cases for individuals while adversely affecting
neighborhoods and the community at large.
For over 200 years, New Haven, has been the home of invention and ex-
perimentation; home of Eli Whitney and the cotton gin;' Louie's Lunch and the
hamburger;2 the Amistad Rebellion of 18393 and the Black Panther trials of
the 1970s; 4 Sally's Apizza, Pepe's Apizza and the world's best pizza; 5 the first
1. Eli Whitney's workshop is maintained at the Eli Whitney Museum on Whitney Avenue
in New Haven.
2. Louie's Lunch claims to be the site where the first hamburger was sold.
3. The Anistad was a slave ship that landed in New Haven after a rebellion by the slaves
on board. The status of the passengers was litigated. The former slaves were victorious and de-
clared free. A statue commemorating the Amistad Rebellion stands in front of New Haven City
Hall. According to Susan Bickelhaup & Maureen Dezell, Living, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 1997,
at C2, Steven Spielberg is planning a movie about the Amistad Rebellion.
4. For a brief history of the Black Panther trials, see Richard Perez-Pena, Ex-Panthers Lose
(Vol. 16:2
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organized telephone system;6 Yale University; and, at least temporarily, Wil-
liam Howard Taft, George Bush, Bill Clinton, Clarence Thomas and too many
others to recount.
New Haven is also a city of contrasts: a high number of subsidized housing
units (over one-third of the total housing units) 7 in the wealthiest state per cap-
ita in the country;8 an architecturally beautiful housing stock with over seven
hundred abandoned buildings;9 a remarkably diverse population living in a se-
verely segregated community, with architectural and artificial barriers separat-
ing people by race and class;10 a community integrated with its suburbs only
during working hours," but separated at all other times by race, class and na-
tional origin; 12 a community with exceptional health care facilities, 3 but a high
infant mortality rate14 and a high incidence of AIDS cases.15
New Haven is also a community in which various federal, state, local and
private actors, including some of our most innovative and creative thinkers,
have chosen to test their ideas, from housing projects16 to urban renewal to in-
terstate highways1 7 to legal services' s to needle exchange programs19 to vol-
Retrial Motion, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1993, at S.
5. People from Chicago, Boston, Providence and New York will have to accept this. No
other city has a serious claim. Sally's and Pepe's both claim to be the originator of the pizza.
6. In 1878, George W. McCoy founded the New Haven Telephone Co., serving, initially,
twenty-two subscribers. He also published the first American telephone directory. By -1884,
there were over 700 telephones in New Haven-only Boston, New York and Philadelphia had
more. Floyd M. Shumway & Richard Hegel, New Haven in 1884, 30 J. OF THE NEW HAVEN
COLONY HIST. SOc'Y 25 (1983).
7. Robert C. Ellickson, Yale Law School, class materials, based on information from Judy
Sklarz, City of New Haven.
8. STATE RANKINGS 1995: A STATIsTICAL VIEW OF THE 50 UNITED STATES 105 (Kathleen
O'Leary Morgan et al. eds., 6th ed. 1995).
9. 1996 estimate by the Office of Housing and Neighborhood Development, City of New.
Haven, based on drive-by identification of vacant and boarded-up buildings.
10. Cynthia Farrar et al., New Haven Maps '95, in THE REGIONAL DATA COOPERATIVE FOR
NEW HAVEN 20, 23-27 (1995).
11. Id. at38-41.
12. For a discussion of the ethnic population, see infra part I.B.
13. New Haven is home to Yale and St. Raphael Hospitals as well as several clinics and
HMOs. For a sense of regional use of a New Haven medical facility, see Farrar et al., supra note
10, at41.
14. Id. at 27; United Illuminating. UI Energizes Project Mothercare With On-Street Elec-
trical Service, BUSINESS WIRE, Nov. 30, 1994.
15. See Redouble AIDS Prevention Efforts, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 13, 1994, at B8
(editorial).
16. For a discussion on the history of public housing, see infra part IV.
17. Both 1-91 and 1-95 pass through New Haven, leading New Haven to advertise itself as
"The Gateway to New England."
18. In 1963, the Ford Foundation included a legal services component as part of Community
Progress, Inc., an umbrella social services agency. The legal services program, incorporated in
1964 as New Haven Legal Assistance Association, Inc., became one of the models for the federal
1997]
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untarily integrating city public schools with those of the suburbs (and then
canceling the integration program).20 Not all of these ideas have worked.
There is a long history of racial discrimination in this country. We look at
segregated cities as the result of this discrimination, with the residents of seg-
regated, impoverished neighborhoods as the victims of intentional wrongdoing.
A study of New Haven, however, shows a different scenario. In many in-
stances, integrationists won the policy battle, implementing plans that were
race-conscious--not to perpetuate segregation, but to provide improved hous-
ing, on occasion to promote integrated housing and equal opportunity, and to
prevent whites from leaving the city. The result of these polices was a racially
segregated, impoverished city. Many of the policymakers acted with good in-
tentions and would be appalled at the notion that they promoted segregation.
How did this happen? In this paper, I argue that concentrating on race in-
stead of class was a critical mistake. The development of the suburbs, bank
investment in suburban mortgages, the interstate highway system, a rapidly ex-
panding economy, suburban housing developers and the baby boom were
forces beyond the control of city government. Trying to keep second and third
generation whites from moving to the suburbs was trying to fight historical im-
perative. A policy which emphasized preserving traditional neighborhoods,
concentrating on ownership and services, might have made some difference as
to race and likely would have helped maintain a middle class, regardless of
race. The progressive policy was not to preserve, however, but to tear down
and renew.
While much of this paper details the flow of people, jobs, and housing over
a 200 year period, the paper is motivated by an interest in tipping, as a process
of examining when and why people leave a particular neighborhood.
"Tipping" is a term in epidemiology which signifies that point at which an or-
dinary event spreads to epidemic proportions. For example, consider the flu.
Flu is contagious. It spreads when people have close contact with other people
carrying flu germs. If we know the number of people in contact with the flu
and the percentage of the population which is likely to contract the flu from
these contacts, we can determine the rate at which the flu will spread. Since
the flu lasts from three to four days, when we subtract the number of people
who recover each day, we know whether the flu is spreading, has stabilized, or
is abating.
21
While the formula is straightforward, filling in the variables can be a
legal services program.
19. Ian S. Trowbridge, Opinion, Clean Needles Could Save Many Lines, S.D. UNION -
TRIB., July 25, 1994, at B7; Connecticut Study Shows Value of Needle-Exchange Programs,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 4, 1994, at E2; John W. Frece & Timothy B. Wheeler, Schaefer
Reluctantly OKs Needle Exchange, BALTIMORE SUN, May 3, 1994, at lB.
20. Separate Schools?, HARTFORD COURANT, July 10, 1996, at A10.
21. See Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point, THE NEW YORKER, June 3, 1996, at 32-38.
[Vol. 16:2
HeinOnline  -- 16 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 268 1996-1997
BUILDING A SEGREGATED CITY
monumental task. For example, imagine the closed environment of a school
during a flu outbreak. One communicable child attending school may come
into contact with thirty other school children. If ten percent of those in contact
with the flu contract the illness, three additional children will become ill each
day. If they attend school while they are communicable, as the first child did,
these three will come in contact with other children. Once the flu spreads
across classroom lines, it is just a matter of days before the whole school is ex-
posed, not to mention the children's parents and their coworkers, the cowork-
ers' children, their children's classmates, etc. However, while the flu is
spreading, the first child, who carried the flu to school, will recover and return
to school, symptom-free, before the last member of his class feels the first
symptoms. If the flu spreads faster than people recover, the flu will tip into
epidemic proportions. The value of tipping as a tool is based on this mathe-
matical certainty. If the variables are correct, an epidemiologist can predict the
future course of the illness.
While tipping in epidemiology informs public policy in disease-
management issues as diverse as vaccinations, needle exchange programs,
quarantines and hospital protocols, there is a question as to the value of tipping
as an analytical, as opposed to a descriptive, tool in other areas. The "broken
window syndrome," i.e. the effect an unrepaired broken window (or a deterio-
rated house or an unkempt vacant lot) has on a neighborhood, is a variant on
tipping, but is descriptive and ignores the mathematical certainty of a tipping
formula based on accurate data.22 We will get back to tipping shortly. First, to
place tipping into context, it is important to get a sense of the changing demo-
graphics of New Haven and comparable cities.
A. Population
According to the 1790 census, at that time New Haven had a population of
4,487, less than 15% of the New Haven county population of 30,830 and less
than 2% of Connecticut's population of 237,946.23 Those numbers were to
change dramatically, particularly from 1880 onwards. Aided by large scale
immigration, New Haven's population increased by 38% between 1880 and
1890, 25% between 1890 and 1900, 23% between 1900 and 1910 and 22%
between 1910 and 1920. By 1920, New Haven's population was 162,537, with
a suburban population of 43,134. New Haven dominated its county, contain-
ing 39% of the county population and almost 13% of the state population.
In 1920, the census showed for the first time that more than half of the
American population lived in urban areas. New Haven peaked, however, in
1920 as the center of a metropolitan area. Between 1920 and 1950, New Ha-
22. Id.
23. This and all following information concerning population is from the Bureau of the Cen-
sus, unless otherwise noted.
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ven's population increased by only 1% while the suburban population in-
creased by 33%, the county by 31% and the state by 57%. After 1950, New
Haven underwent massive urban renewal, community disintegration and white
flight. From 1950 to 1980, New Haven's population dropped to 126,109, a de-
crease of over 23%. After a modest increase to 130,474 in 1990, New Haven
faced further shrinkage, with current population estimates as low as 120,000, a
number comparable to the 1905 population. At the same time, New Haven's
suburban population increased by over 23 1%, New Haven county by 47% and
Connecticut by 64%. By 1990, New Haven had roughly half the population of
its suburbs. New Haven's population represented 16% of the county and, for
the first time since 1830, less than 4% of the State.
B. Ethnic Populations: How White Europeans Came to New Haven (But
Only for an Extended Visit)
Discussing eating in unfamiliar cities, Calvin Trillin writes:
When an Italian restaurant is suggested, for instance, I always say, 'Who con-
trols the city council here?' I suppose a good Italian restaurant could exist in a
city that doesn't have enough Italians to constitute at least a powerful minority
in city politics, but a man in town for only two or three meals has to go with
the percentages.
24
By Trillin's standard, a visitor to 1996 New Haven, a city famous for its
Italian restaurants, would be safer eating Italian food in the suburbs. For while
the early history of New Haven is dominated by 19th and early 20th century
immigration from Europe, the history of the latter half of the 20th century is
dominated by the emigration of those same ethnic white Europeans.
In 1850, over 18% of New Haven's white residents were foreign-born,
compared to 14% in New Haven county, 10% in Connecticut, and less than
10% in the United States. Seventy-four percent of New Haven's foreign-born
population was Irish, with English and German immigrants representing an ad-
ditional 17%. By 1870, the percentage of foreign-born residents increased to
28% in New Haven city, 25% in New Haven county, and 21% in Connecticut,
compared to 14% in the United States as a whole. English, Scottish, Irish,
Welsh and German immigrants constituted 94% of New Haven's foreign-born
population. There were ten Italians in New Haven in 187025 and approxi-
mately 500 by 1880.26 The 1880 census shows Irish, German, Scottish and
English immigrants representing 91% of foreign-born white residents.
These numbers began to change dramatically with the 1900 census. Al-
though the percentage of foreign-born residents in the United States dipped to
under 14%, the percent in New Haven increased to 29% and in New Haven
24. CALVIN TRILLIN, AMERICAN FRIED (1974).
25. Shumway & Hegel, supra note 6, at 44.
26. Id.
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County to 33%. Moreover, while 34% of the city's 30,802 residents were Irish,
15% German, and 9% English/Scottish or Welsh, 17% were Italian, and 10%
Russian. The Italian immigration, started in 1872 by J.B. Sargent in order to
provide workers at his hardware factory, had increased dramatically.27 The
Russian immigrants, who were largely Jews escaping from pogroms, settled in
the Oak Street neighborhood. Jews began to inhabit the Oak Street area in the
1850s; successive waves of Jewish immigrants followed them.28
Within ten years, the number of Italian-born residents rose to 13,159,
which constituted 31% of all foreign-born White residents of New Haven. The
Russian-born population increased to 7,980, 19% of the total.
The Irish population, which was almost 10,000 in 1880, reached a height
of slightly over 10,000 in 1900, decreasing in every census thereafter. By
1950, the Irish-born population was 2,730, showing a marked reduction in Irish
immigration from the potato famine years. By 1990, only 8.7% of New Haven
city residents identified themselves as being of Irish ancestry. However, in the
suburbs immediately surrounding New Haven, a higher, remarkably consistent
percentage of the population identifies itself as Irish. If Woodbridge (9.8%) is
excluded, the range is from a low of 13.9% in Orange to a high of 18.8% in
Madison.
In 1920, of the 48,689 foreign-born white citizens in New Haven city,
15,064 (31%) were Italian-born and 8,080 (17%) were Russian-born, a total of
48%. Jews continued to populate the Oak Street and surrounding Hill neigh-
borhood. With sixty-nine storekeepers on Oak Street, the neighborhood was "a
shopper's mecca for the entire city and outlying communities."
29
In every post-1920 census, with the exception of the 1950 post-war census,
the numbers of foreign-born residents steadily decreased, from 40,544 in 1930
to 10,633 in 1990. While the absolute numbers of Italian and Russian immi-
grants decreased as well, their percentage among the foreign-born community
remained high, at 36% and 15% in 1930 and 38% and 16% in 1950.
By 1990, New Haven's white ethnic populations had moved to the suburbs.
New Haven, at 14.6%, had a lower percentage of Italian-Americans than any
of its immediate suburbs, particularly East Haven (41.3%), North Haven
(31%), Hamden (25.4%) and West Haven (26.4%). The Italian migration,
however, was not just to the north and east, but to the south and west as well,
as Woodbridge (17%) and Orange (24.3%) had Italian-American populations
substantially larger than any other ethnic group. Italian-Americans represented
33.7% of the 1990 suburban population, more than twice that of the city.
The absence of Italians from the center city is even more dramatic when
27. Id.
28. Silverman, Oak Street, New Haven-A Portrait from the Past, in JEWS 1N NEW HAvEN,
116 (Jewish Historical Society of New Haven, Inc.).
29. Id. at 118.
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New Haven's East Shore is considered. The eastern-most part of the city, bor-
dering on East Haven, is almost exclusively white. A large Italian population,
particularly in Morris Cove, is separated from most of New Haven by New
Haven Harbor, and is more like neighboring East Haven (41.3% Italian) than
the rest of New Haven.
While the numbers are smaller with Irish-American, German-American,
English-American, and Polish-American populations, the trend is the same,
with suburban white European populations at least twice as high as New Ha-
ven city (with the exception of Polish-Americans at 4.2% in the city and 7.9%
in the suburbs). As a group, Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans, German-
Americans, English-Americans and Polish-Americans represent over 92% of
the suburbs, but only 40% of the city.
Not surprisingly, New Haven's black and Hispanic populations increased
as the white population decreased. The black population of New Haven in-
creased from 4,573 in 1920 to 9,605 in 1950 to 47,157 in 1990. The black
percentage of the population increased from under 3% in 1920 to over 36% in
1990. The Hispanic population, which was reported in the 1930's census as
one person of Mexican origin and was unreported for 1940 through 1960, rose
from 4,916 in 1970 to 17,243 in 1990. By 1990, the combined black and His-
panic population exceeded 46%,30 up from 6% in 1950. These percentages in-
crease dramatically if the largely white East Shore (three census tracts on the
eastern edge of the city) and Westville (two census tracts on the western edge)
are excluded. The eastern census tracts in 1990 contained 18,000 whites and
1,967 blacks. (The census tract surrounded by New Haven Harbor on one side
and East Haven on the other had 5,159 whites and 15 blacks). The Westville
section of the city contained 6,055 whites and 689 blacks. By carving off these
eastern and western sections, the black population jumps from 36% to 42% of
the remaining more central city, while the combined black and Hispanic
population exceeds 50%.
C. Work
As early as 1820, workers in New Haven were more likely to be involved
in manufacturing than in agriculture and commerce combined. Although the
1820 census included only 1,152 workers, 710 identified their occupation as
manufacturing, 321 as commerce, and 121 as agriculture. Twenty years later,
the emphasis on manufacturing was even more dramatic, with 1,653 workers
of a total of 2,307 identifying their occupation as manufacturing. By 1870, the
census identified almost 18,000 workers, with less than half (47.6%) engaged
in manufacturing, 30% engaged in the new category "professional and service"
(which included barbers, domestic workers and actors) and 20.5% engaged in
30. This number includes 3% of the population which is both Black and H-ispanic for census
purposes.
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trade and transportation. While the total number of workers exceeded 24,000
by 1880, and 45,000 by 1900, the percentages remained fairly constant. (The
1900 census separated domestic and personal service from professional for the
first time, with domestic and personal services representing 23.1% of the work
force and professionals representing 5.2%.) With a burgeoning World War I
industry and an increased population, the 1920s census showed that manufac-
turing was flourishing, representing more than half of a work force exceeding
63,000 people.
The gun industry dominated the city. The Winchester Repeating Arms
Co., which had been situated in New Haven since 1855,31 was by far the larg-
est employer. Winchester was best known for manufacturing the Winchester
Rifle, "the gun that won the West."32 During World War I, Winchester em-
ployed over 22,000 people, more than two-thirds of those working in manu-
facturing in all of New Haven.33 Although there are no precise records, by
some estimates, as many as 26,000 people worked at Winchester by the end of
the war.34 At its height, Winchester was a town unto itself, with a company-
owned bank, bowling alley and other entertainment spots. Winchester em-
ployment rolls fell dramatically after World War I. The surrounding
Newhallville neighborhood, which was largely dependent on Winchester, suf-
fered dramatically.
35
While it is difficult to track manufacturing jobs after 1920 due to changes
in census categories, by 1940 the service industry (including clerical, domestic
service, manager, professional and service categories) exceeded 40% of the
work force for the first time. With "sales" added into the mix, by 1950 these
categories exceeded 45%. By 1990, services represented 45.5% of the work
force. When transportation (3.4%), communication and utilities (3.2% collec-
tively), finance, insurance and real estate (5.9% collectively) and public ad-
ministration (4.3%) are added in, the total of the service industries exceeded
60%, with manufacturing representing only 16.4%. The 1990 total work force
of 58,000 was almost 15% lower than the 1950 high of over 67,000.
D. Schools
While education is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note
that the percentage of minorities in New Haven's public schools is twice as
high as the general population. According to the Connecticut Department of
31. Joe Dobrow, A Farewell to Arms: The Mutual Rise and Fall of the Winchester Repeat-
ing Arms Company and New Haven, Connecticut, 39 L OF THE NEW HAVEN COLONY HIST.
SOC'Y 20, 23 (1992).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Paul Bass, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1985.
35. Id.
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Education, during the 1995-1996 school year, New Haven's public schools
were 13.39% white and 86.61% minority. These numbers were reversed in the
surrounding suburbs, with West Haven at 64.81% white and 35.19% minority,
Woodbridge at 91.53% white and 8.47% minority, Hamden at 72.73% white
and 27.27% minority, North Haven at 91.52% white and 8.48% minority and
East Haven at 93.70% white and 6.30% minority.36 Thus, the public schools
tipped, earlier and more dramatically than the population as a whole. One
element of school tipping is New Haven's extensive private school network,
from pre-schools through secondary schools. The private school system has
allowed white families to leave the public schools while continuing to reside in
the city. One common scenario is for newly hired Yale faculty to reside in the
city, while sending their children to private schools.
II. MORE ON TIPPING
Thomas Schelling, expanding on his earlier discussion of micromotives 37
(more or less, the small events that lead us to do what we do, with large socie-
tal consequences), applied a tipping analysis to describe "white flight." White
flight is the phenomenon that occurs when white residents leave a neighbor-
hood or a school, often in large numbers, in response to an influx of minorities
into the neighborhood.38 Schelling noted that the entrance of a few members
of a minority often caused other members of the formerly homogeneous com-
munity to leave, thus creating vacancies which could be filled by additional
minorities, until the neighborhood had "tipped." Schelling argued that each
person has a tipping point. The neighborhood tipping point is a factor of the
cumulative tipping points of the neighborhood residents.39 Tipping became so
commonly identified with white flight that one commentator defined tipping as
"a sociological term that describes the tendency of White families to abandon
residential areas once the Black population exceeds a certain critical 'tipping
point' resulting in a neighborhood that is overwhelmingly black."4° Others
have applied a tipping analysis to white flight from schools4' or even to in-
creases and decreases in crime rates.
42
"White flight" exemplifies the difficulty of extending tipping beyond epi-
demiology. Tipping implies mathematical certainty. Even assuming a certain
36. Mike Swift & Robert A Frahm, The Suburbs Are Not as White as When Lawsuit Was
Filed, HARTFORD COURANT, July 10, 1996, at A12. These numbers were similar to Bridgeport
(11.73% white and 88.27% minority) and Hartford (4.97% white and 95.03% minority). Id.
37. Thomas Schelling, On the Ecology of Micromotives, 25 THE PUB. INTEREST 59 (1971)
38. THOMAS SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978).
39. Id.
40. Rodney A. Smolla, Integration Maintenance: The Unconstitutionality of Benign Pro-
grams That Discourage Black Entry To Prevent White Flight, 1981 DUKE L.J. 891, 893 (1981).
41. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALEL. J. 585, 630 (1983).
42. Gladwell, supra note 21.
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degree of inaccuracy in the data of any given public health concern, the goal of
tipping analysis is to create a formulaic resolution which attempts to predict,
not merely describe. The departure of a homogeneous group from a particular
neighborhood is difficult to reduce to mathematical certainty. Group departure
is often psychological, based on a belief system of real and false memories, re-
alistic and unrealistic future expectations and fear of change. Schelling noted
that tipping points are personal and individual tipping points can vary dramati-
cally.
43
The difficulty of assessment can be seen in a variety of areas. In housing,
three expert witnesses in United States v. Starrett City Associates,4 a housing
discrimination case, testified, respectively, that tipping occurs (1) between 10%
and 20% minority population, (2) at 40% black population and (3) at more than
33% minority population. In education, one commentator has asserted that
tipping in schools "has typically been estimated to occur when the population
of blacks is between 25 and 50 percent, complicated by reassignment of
whites, perceived disruptions of busing and educational quality, the strength of
white prejudice, the economics of 'fleeing,' media coverage and official support
for desegregation. 45 In epidemiology, tipping is caused by objective facts. In
housing and education, tipping is caused by subjective opinion. It is not so
much that a neighborhood is tipping, but that the neighborhood's residents be-
lieve it is tipping or will tip.
In the most pragmatic market sense, a property owner who believes his
$100,000 asset will soon be worth $75,000 will sell before the market drops to
the low point, even if that means settling for a price between $75,000 and
$100,000. Since that sale helps establish the new market for similar property,
other property owners feel increased pressure to protect their investment. As
people leave and new, often more diverse, people move into the neighborhood,
other pressures mount. Sometimes these pressures can be summed up as "the
neighborhood is changing and it's time to move." Substituting "tipping" for
"changing" does not affect the concept.
In some neighborhoods, the economic and psychological push results in
tipping and mass departure at an early stage; other neighborhoods are more re-
silient to change. Thus, tipping could occur with a 10% racial change in some
neighborhoods, but not until 50% in others. Hence, there is great difficulty in
predicting when a neighborhood is likely to tip, as opposed to noting past hoc,
that the neighborhood has tipped. In a recent magazine article, Malcolm
43. Schelling, supra note 37.
44. 840 F. 2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988). See also Lisa J. LaPlace, The Legality of Integration
Maintenance Quotas: Fair Housing or Forced Housing? 55 BROOK. L. REV. 197 (1989);
Schelling, supra note 37.
45. Jennifer Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize
Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 807 (1995).
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Gladwell described the marked drop in reported crimes in New York City in
terms of tipping.46 Gladwell's article, while fascinating, suggested only that
crime in New York may have tipped for the better, with no attempt to identify
the tipping point or to predict future behavior. Gladwell notes the difficulty of
identifying the tipping point even in epidemiological cases like AIDS.
47
As Schelling notes, tipping has been applied to "occupations, clubs, frater-
nities, medical schools, colleges, public beaches, tennis courts, restaurants,
night clubs, and public parks. " 48 Each of these applications is limited to ex-
plaining the point at which people leave (tipping out) or join (tipping in). Yet,
although Schelling describes micromotives and tipping as a principle govern-
ing everyday life, from watering lawns to traffic jams, most applications are
limited to the question of integration. To the extent that policy makers have
looked at tipping, it has generally been with the purpose of preventing white
flight, often with disastrous results. A few of New Haven's disasters will be
discussed later in this paper.
As John 0. Calmore wrote, "Integrationists, black and white, traditionally
have focused on an individualized equality of opportunity... Integrationists
have never really accepted community enrichment as an appropriate prelude to
broad-scale integration." 49 Calmore argues that we would be better off trying
to achieve "spacial equality,"50 in which we redirect resources to improve the
quality of life in the black community. Calmore suggests that integration has
not worked because of white resistance beyond a certain point, a view consis-
tent with Shelling's micromotive tipping analysis. Furthermore, blacks who are
accepted into white neighborhoods undergo tremendous stress and suffer a loss
of community connection.51
A policy which places a premium on spacial equality would differ dramati-
cally from New Haven's history, in which whole neighborhoods were razed
with the primary goal of encouraging white people to remain in New Haven
instead of moving to the suburbs.
We need to get beyond race as the sole tipping factor. Schelling demon-
strates how small stimuli or narrow preference can magnify into major conse-
quence. We need to ask how we can apply a tipping analysis to improve
neighborhoods. In terms of the "broken window syndrome," we need to figure
46. Gladwell, supra note 21, at 37. Gladwell cites Jonathan Crane's 1991 study in the
American Journal of Sociology for the proposition that social problems spread like epidemics:
"at the five-percent tipping point neighborhoods go from relatively functional to wildly dysfunc-
tional virtually overnight." Id.
47. Id.
48. Schelling, supra note 37, at 101.
49. John 0. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-to-the-
Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1487, 1492 (1993).
50. Id. See also Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L. J. 758 (1990).
51. Id.
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out how many windows have to be repaired before a neighborhood will start to
improve and tip for the better.
These difficulties are magnified when one attempts to apply a tipping for-
mula to housing issues other than white flight, such as blight. While the spread
of blight may be analogous to the spread of disease, there are few empirical
housing studies comparable to an epidemiological study. This lack of empiri-
cal data, especially during the "epidemic," hinders our efforts in developing an
effective housing policy.
The ongoing efforts in New Haven to combat blight are instructive in this
regard. During 1994, Mayor John DeStefano directed the city's housing office
to identify and remediate blighted housing units. For this purpose, blight was
defined as unoccupied and deteriorated units. The housing office identified
over 600 units and took corrective action. A year later, when the Mayor asked
how many blighted units were left in New Haven, the answer was over 600.
These were, however, not the same units.
52
An ad hoe committee of city and Yale professionals, including representa-
tives from the fields of architecture, management, law, planning and sociology,
met over a period of months to develop an anti-blight strategy. The committee,
although it had access to the city apparatus, was unable to answer the questions
of whether blight was moving in a particular direction, was haphazard within
certain neighborhoods or whether there were indications of blight that would
allow blighted units to be identified at an earlier stage.
53
Whether such information would be useful in formulating housing policy
remains to be seen. It is one thing to identify neighborhoods that have tipped
and another to predict future trends. However, even a post-tipping recognition
can be critical in informing housing policy. In the mid-1980s, the federal gov-
ernment funded an "In-Fill Program" in New Haven and other cities. Under
the In-Fill Program, private developers built two and three-unit, owner-
occupied housing on isolated vacant parcels by literally "filling-in" empty
spaces in blocks. The dominant public policy driving the In-fill Program was
home ownership. Many of the parcels were odd-shaped; most of the neighbor-
hoods were in poor condition. Many of the units developed as in-fill housing
have since deteriorated, consistent with current belief that a bad neighborhood
will affect a good building more readily than the other way around. The key
determinant in building in-fill housing, however, was the existence of the va-
cant lot and a belief that home-ownership was a sufficient factor in transform-
ing a neighborhood. If the city and federal governments had applied a tipping
analysis, they would not have built new housing on some of those blocks.
Recently, I represented a grandmother in an action against her landlord,
52. Discussion with Victoria Bok, Director, New Haven Office of Housing and Neighbor-
hood Development, at the Yale Law School Housing and Community Development Clinic (1995).
53. The author participated in these meetings.
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based on her grandson's lead poisoning from peeling and chipping paint in
their rental apartment. Near the end of the case, we arranged to meet at her
new, lead-safe apartment in New Haven, a few days before Christmas, 1995.
When I arrived at my client's home, I was dismayed to see how badly the
surrounding block had deteriorated. Four or five buildings in the immediate
vicinity were boarded up. Although the block consisted of two and three-
family attractively-designed buildings, all were in a state of disrepair. The
porch of my client's building looked like it might collapse. A car on the street
appeared abandoned. Several street lights were not working and the street had
a desolate look.
The bell to my client's apartment did not work and she could not hear my
knocking. Since the front door did not close properly, I was able to walk in
and climb the stairs to my client's second floor apartment. The hall was fairly
dark, lit only by an exposed bulb at the top of the stairs. I knocked on my cli-
ent's door, she opened it and I entered a different world.
Inside, the living room was dominated by a decorated Christmas tree, with
presents underneath. The apartment was completely furnished and immacu-
late. We sat at the kitchen table, filling out forms. Just as I had felt unwel-
comed and uncomfortable outside of the apartment, I felt welcomed and com-
fortable inside.
Almost two years have passed and I still wonder, as I did that night, about
my client, her apartment, her block, her neighborhood and her city. How
should the housing conditions, so easily observable inside and outside the
apartment, inform our housing policy? The neighborhood had tipped. Barring
major redevelopment, it is unlikely that this block will change in the near fu-
ture, other than by demolishing one or more buildings. Given New Haven's
status as a shrinking city, this particular block is not likely to be a candidate for
the expenditure of public or private funds.
Yet, this conclusion troubled me. I felt as though there should be a way to
factor my client and her efforts into our housing policy. If one believes, as I
do, that successful neighborhoods start with and depend on committed resi-
dents, to what degree should we base development decisions on the existence
of such people? Is one person enough? Stated another way, should we rede-
velop my client's block around my client or should we give her the opportunity
to move to a more stable neighborhood? Should we focus on these issues in
granting demand-side tenant subsides like Section 8? How about supply-side
owner subsidies like tax credits? Should Legal Services programs prioritize
eviction defenses based on whether a neighborhood has tipped and in which
direction? These are some of the questions I have been thinking about since
December 1995.
III. PLANNING
New Haven, the first planned community in the United States, was de-
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signed by John Brockett in 1638.54 The original city plan of nine squares with
a green in the center was based on the Temple of Solomon. The nine squares
was only the first of many plans. In December 1910, the New Haven Civic
Improvement Commission, by architect Cass Gilbert and landscape architect
Frederick Law Olmsted, reported their vision of New Haven. The New Haven
Civic Improvement Committee, which was appointed by the Mayor, included,
in addition to the Mayor, a member of the Board of Alderman (New Haven's
legislature) and nine other citizens. The Committee met for the first time on
July 1, 1907, at which time Gilbert and Olmsted were retained. It was not until
October 7, however, that the Mayor appointed Sylvester Z. Poli to the com-
mittee, "in order that our Italo-American citizens might be represented,""5 The
report itself noted that planning, as a form of socialism, was controversial. The
planners justified their work based on the current rate of growth in the city and
a need for a rational urban development.56
The report noted that New Haven was growing very rapidly and predicted
a population of 400,000 by 1950 and that "the end of the 20th century would
find the New Haven Green the center of a metropolitan population of about 1.5
million, substantially the situation of the Boston Common today.57 The report
predicted that the composition of the population would change, as recent im-
migrants from southern and eastern Europe, with their higher birth rate, "would
soon overtake the older sources of foreign population." 58 The report warned of
the danger to "people of old New England stock" who still controlled the city:
If they want New Haven to be a fit and worthy place for their descendants it
behooves them to establish conditions about the lives of all the people that will
make the best fellow-citizens of them and their children. The racial habits and
traditions ... of the newer elements of the population are such that a laissez-
faire policy applicable to New England Yankees is not going to apply to
them. 
9
The report foresaw transportation as a critical element in future growth,
with separate discussions of the railroad, the harbor, main thoroughfares, street
car lines and parkways (referring to park-like approaches to parks), as well as
amenities like parks, playgrounds, rural parks, reservations, street landscaping
and even poles, wires and advertising signs. The report is quite detailed, withspecific recommendations for roads and neighborhoods, including a downtown
54. New Haven Scene of Regional City Planning, NEW HAVEN REG., Aug. 14, 1955.
55. Letter from George Dudley Seymour submitting the Report of the New Haven Civic Im-
provement Commission (Sept. 26, 1910).
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subway beneath Temple Street, a prohibition of buildings, statues and gardens
on the New Haven Green, construction of a public comfort station and a band-
stand and limitation on the height of buildings around the Green.
61
The report does not discuss how to house a tripling of the population by
1950, other than to note that housing, along with transportation and sanitation,
had to be controlled in order to conserve the "natural advantages" of climate,
situation, and surroundings.
62
In 1923, Technical Advisory Corporation, a consulting firm, prepared a
plan calling for the development of recreation areas along the east side of the
harbor and new industrial areas in the western part of the city. Traffic was al-
ready a problem in New Haven and the plan called for a large number of new
thoroughfares. 63 The plan had "no noticeable effect" on development. 4
In 1941, the City retained Maynard Meyer and Maurice Rotival to develop
a master plan. The plan, which became known as the Rotival Plan ("Plan"),
had several goals:
1. Protect capital investment in the central business area;
2. Provide a suitable industrial area which could be expanded without de-
stroying New Haven's natural beauty;
3. Redevelop the harbor and the waterfront as a major port, while re-
claiming some part of the area for recreational use; and
4. Rehabilitate blighted areas of the city.
65
The planners noted that the natural center of the city was the New Haven
Green, with an orientation towards the harbor and that, while the railroad was
fully developed, the highways and streets were not. Their plan called for de-
veloping New Haven as a primary traffic distribution center for the state.
The Rotival Plan included several specific proposals:
1. Center city-Meyer and Rotival recommended a reorganization of
downtown, confirming the traditional center at the New Haven Green, but
opening toward the Harbor, with a coordinated scheme of buildings, streets
and covered parking spaces, centered on a reorganization of the retail center to
the southwest of the Green, toward Oak Street. South of the retail center, the
Plan recommended the establishment of a wholesale and market center. In or-
der to connect the existing hospital and medical center with Yale University,
the Plan recommended introducing new industrial and commercial labs. In or-
der to serve the transportation needs .of the reorganized center city, the Plan
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. SHERMAN HASBROUCK, EVOLUTION OF COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING IN NEW HAVEN,
CITY PLAN DEPARTMENT FOR THE COMMUNITY RENEWAL PROGRAM OF NEW HAVEN,
CONNECTICUT 4 (1963).
64. Id.
65. CITY PLAN COMM'N, NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT: AN OUTLINE OF MASTER PLAN
PRINCIPLES 1-2 (1943).
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sought the creation of a transportation center near the current railroad to serve
rail, auto, bus and airplane traffic.
66
2. Thoroughfares-Interstate traffic should be routed near but not through
the center of the city, with a general passenger traffic route approaching the
city along the coastline and within view of the sea (the line of the current 1-95).
Truck and passenger routes approaching the city should be separated, with
secondary traffic lines connecting to main interregional parkways. Trucks
routes should be connected to industrial, wholesale and transportation areas,
with residential streets revised to connect to the main traffic areas.
67
3. Harbor-There should be direct access to the harbor from the center of
the city. The harbor should be reestablished as a port of commerce with trans-
portation facilities and an industrial area, with the rest of the waterfront used
for recreation. The east side of the harbor, which was the least densely popu-
lated area, would be the best site for the port.
68
4. Industry-While the planners believed the New Haven economy was
dependent on industry, they stressed that this industry could be regional rather
than in the city proper, with the city still accruing the economic advantages.
Their plan was dependent on their vision of New Haven as a transportation
center. They suggested the establishment of an area near the harbor for indus-
tries that were dependent on harbor accessibility, with consolidation of all in-
dustries in the city into a few areas, allowing for further industrial expansion
along the main railroad lines north of the city.
69
5. Neighborhoods-The Plan recommended arranging residential neigh-
borhoods into homogeneous units of detached houses, row houses, apartment
houses, or a combination, each with its own grade school, community center
and recreational facilities. Neighborhoods should be separated from each other
by buffer strips of trees and shrubs or main transportation lines. Through traf-
fic should be eliminated to provide for "safe and quiet" neighborhoods. Each
neighborhood should be accessible to an adequate shopping center.70
The Rotival Plan had little effect, which Rotival attributed to the fact that
he and the city planner were both drafted.71
The Housing Act of 1949 established federally-assisted urban renewal
programs and the Interstate Highway Program.72 New Haven responded in
1953 with a "short approach plan. 7 3 This plan proposed building a turnpike
66. Id. at 7.
67. Id. at 9.
68. Id. at 10.
69. Id. at 10-11.
70. Id. at 11.
71. Maurice E.H. Rotival, An Experiment in Organic Planning for New Haven, U.S.A.
TOMORROW, Jan. 1955, at 16-22.
72. Pub. L. No. 80-171, 63 Stat. 677.
73. For an outline of master plan principles, see id. at 7.
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across the Harbor at a location close to where 1-95 was ultimately built, as well
as proposing the route of 1-91 through the western part of Wooster Square.
Rotival and City Planning Director Norris Andreus integrated these changes
into their earlier plan.74 The planners suggested that the turnpike be routed
northward through Wooster Square to East Rock and then branching, one
branch northward to the Merrit Parkway and the other westward, then branch-
ing again, one branching eastward along the coast (1-95) and the other branch-
ing northeasterly as a new freeway to Hartford (1-91). While it took several
years, both 1-95 and 1-91 were built, along lines similar to Rotival's recommen-
dations, with a critical change: the 1-91 route was changed to create an artifi-
cial loop, which had the effect of running along the western side of Famnam
Courts, thus isolating a large low-income housing project from downtown and
the wealthier, whiter Wooster Square (traditionally an Italian neighborhood,
where the world's best pizza restaurants are located) and East Rock
(predominately identified with Yale, and widely known in 1997 as the
"graduate student ghetto"). The effect was to align Famnam Courts more with
Fair Haven (to the east) than with Wooster Square and downtown.
After two unsuccessful challenges, Richard C. Lee was elected Mayor of
New Haven in 1953, taking office on January 1, 1954, beginning a sixteen-
year reign that would change the face of New Haven. Lee's tenure has been
the subject of numerous books and articles, making modem New Haven one of
the most studied cities in the country.75 For Lee's views on planning and de-
velopment, we can look to his own words and those of his planner and his de-
velopment administrator, Maurice Rotival and Edward Logue.
After one year as mayor, Lee wrote that when he became mayor, "[a]s far
as I could see we had no future at all--unless, somehow, something big,
something new, something comprehensive could be done and done quickly."
76
Lee consulted with Maurice Rotival, the same planner who had in 1941 pro-
posed routing a future express highway system through New Haven.
77
Lee wanted a program that emphasized rebuilding the city. He saw this as
a private function. The public function was "to show the way, to help the
community help itself, and to cooperate fully and completely with public self-
help all along the line."78 Lee appointed a fifteen-member Citizens Action
Commission (C.A.C.) chaired by Carl G. Freese, the president of Connecticut
Savings Bank; vice-chaired by A. Whitney Griswold, president of Yale Uni-
versity; and including local leaders like James W. Hock, the chairman of
74. Id. at 7-8.
75. See, e.g., ALLAN R. TALBOT, THE MAYOR'S GAME: RICHARD LEE OF NEW HAVEN AND
THE POLITICS OF CHANGE (1967).
76. Richard C. Lee, New Haven Plans for Tomorrow, U.S.A. TOMORROW, Jan. 1955, at 12-
15.
77. Id. at 12-13.
78. Id. at 13.
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United Illuminating Company, Patrick B. McGinnis, president of the New
York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, James A. Walsh, Sr., chairman of
the Armstrong Rubber Company, Eugene Rostow, a professor at Yale Law
School, and Mitchell Svirdoff, president of the Connecticut C.I.O. Council.
79
Lee noted that new state highways, "cut through the heart of some of our
slums."80 He saw this as an opportunity to clean up "the worst of the existing
eyesores." 8' Lee saw New Haven as the center of a greater metropolitan area,
noting that "[s]ocial economic and human problems do not stop at the artificial
political boundaries which segregate our community .... 82 He charged the
C.A.C. with securing regional cooperation with his plan.
Lee's comments were accompanied by a companion article by Maurice
Rotival, entitled An Experiment in Organic Planning for New Haven.8 3 Roti-
val put the flesh on the bones of Lee's vision.
Rotival began by noting that New Haven's experiment might be influential
on "the whole science of city and regional planning., 84 Rotival stated that the
planning would be done not by a consulting or planning department, as usual,
"but by a large group of men from every phase of human activity and from all
classes. 85 While it is true that the C.A.C. was all men, Rotival's characteriza-
tion was ironic given the "captains of industry" quality of Lee's appointees,
augmented by two labor representatives and one academic. It would be diffi-
cult to imagine a less representative group than these fifteen white men who
were accustomed to working with each other to decide the city's fate.
Rotival felt that New Haven had to engage in comprehensive planning on a
broad scale in order to prevent the city from dying.86 Rotival emphasized the
"organic" nature of this experiment (the functions and the separate geographi-
cal areas of the city each affecting the other). It was this "organic" view that
necessitated a "master plan," which would lie "in the application to planning of
the most modem methods of organization, statistical classification and tabula-
tion made possible by electronic calculators," as opposed to a planner who,
under the old method "felt himself quite free to calmly prepare his plan, in
collaboration with the Planning Department and deliver his completed work at
79. Id. at 14. Rostow and Svirdoff were to become better known for their roles during the
1960s, Rostow as one of the architects of American policy in Vietnam and Svirdoff as the Ex-
ecutive Director of Community Progress, Inc., an anti-poverty umbrella agency funded by the
Ford Foundation as a model for the federal Office of Economic Opportunity, itself the forerunner
of the Johnson Administration's War on Poverty.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at IS.
83. Rotival, supra note 71, at 16-22.
84. Id. at 16.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 16-17.
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the end of the period assigned to him, often a very long time."87
Rotival stressed the importance of rebuilding downtown New Haven as a
"thriving retail center," with large department stores, parking for several thou-
sand cars both above and below ground, subway connections from block to
block for both cars and people, and platforms for helicopter traffic.88 To help
serve the downtown, Rotival proposed a new distributor road through the old
Oak Street slum, which bordered on downtown New Haven.
89
Almost four years later, Edward J. Logue, development administrator of
New Haven since 1955, with over-all responsibilities for New Haven's urban
renewal program, elaborated on his own ideas in the New York Times Maga-
zine. Logue started with a quotation from Federal Housing Administrator Al-
bert M. Cole: "Any city that does not set in motion by 1960 a comprehensive
program to halt blight will be flirting with municipal ruin by 1965. ''90
Logue bemoaned the failure of cities to enact "a significant master plan,"
noting that theoretical planners catered to the "applause of elegant critics" as
opposed to "the earthier appreciation of politicians who had to try to carry out
the plans and get reelected, too."9 1 He was equally critical of detailed zoning
ordinances, where so many variances were granted as to make a mockery of
zoning. Logue also criticized slum clearance and replacement by large-scale,
low-income housing projects. Instead, he called for a whole new approach of
urban renewal, which "focuses on the city as a whole and treats all urban
problems as interrelated, both in their origin and in their solution,"92 a view
consistent with Rotival's organic planning.
Logue's urban renewal program included seven key components:
1. Total clearance and rebuilding of the worst slums.
2. Relocation of displaced families and businesses. Where public housing
projects are necessary, they should be limited to twenty-five or fifty units at
any one location.
3. Spot clearance of blighted areas.
4. Conservation of sound areas with vigorous zoning and housing code
enforcement.
5. Coordination of highway building with the city's rebuilding program; "a
renewal program which does not provide for an urban highway system to take
through and commuter traffic off regular city streets is a waste of time.
93
6. Revitalization of the central business district, with the goal of making
the city's center core the "favored shopping place of the entire region around
87. Id.
88. Id. at 22.
89. Id.
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it."
7. Clearing out old factories to make way for new ones. "Cities are the
best site for industries; the reason there has been little industrial expansion is
because the best locations are occupied by obsolete factory buildings."
94
Logue offered New Haven as an example of successful urban renewal,
based largely on the complete razing of two tracts, totaling 140 acres of "slums
and blighted commercial structures at the very heart of the downtown area,"
soon to be replaced "by a striking array of new, modem apartments, office
buildings, stores, restaurants, banks and parking facilities," all of which was
connected to a new federal-state highway program to provide access to the
downtown area.95 The net public cost of razing and reselling the land to pri-
vate developers was $22,500,000, of which the federal government paid
$15,000,000 and the city $7,500,000. Other projects in New Haven called for
spot clearance and neighborhood rehabilitation, as opposed to total demolition.
Logue predicted that when these projects were completed, within ten years,
"New Haven believes that it will have become the first city in America to be
completely free of slums and blight" and that Mayor Lee was "well on his way
to doing for city rebuilding what Fiorello LaGuardia did for municipal re-
form--making it colorful, popular and a heavy plus at the polls on election
day.
, 96
Logue stated that New Haven officials had developed four underlying
principles to a successful urban renewal program, which were applicable to
cities in general:
1. Leadership from city hall. "The job cannot be left to ivory-tower plan-
ners and volunteer do-gooders," but must be "a vital part of the down-to-earth
political life of the city," under a strong mayor.
97
2. Organized and strong community support, an activity in which volun-
teers do have an important role to play, as the Citizens Action Commission did
in New Haven. By the time of the Logue article, the Citizens Action Commis-
sion and its working groups included "some 600 business, civic, labor and
community leaders.
98
3. A competent and adequate development and planning staff.
4. Coordinated administration, under the direction of "a single municipal
official with urban renewal his sole responsibility."99 (In this case, Logue)
Logue's article included pictures and artists' renderings of the proposed
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New Haven Green) and the Oak Street connector (a highway connector from
the junction of 1-91 and 1-95, running past the Church Street redevelopment.
The Oak Street connector was built over the completely razed Oak Street
neighborhood.) These two projects were the two most dramatic development
decisions in New Haven in the second half of the twentieth-century. Subse-
quent history has shown that they were also two of the worst decisions.
The newspaper accounts at the time confirm that Lee, Logue and Rotival's
actions were consistent with their vision. In February 1955, Mayor Lee and
fifty-three other New Haveners, including the members of the Citizens Action
Commission, traveled to Philadelphia to view urban redevelopment efforts
there.100 Patrick B. McGinnis, president of the New Haven Railroad, hosted
the trip, providing special cars, meals and cocktails.' 0 ' At a luncheon meeting,
Philadelphian Jeffrey Smith emphasized the similarities between New Haven
and Philadelphia, noting that each was old, was the site of a large university
and had been recently confronted with a traffic-choked business center, slums,
low morale and a declining economy.1°2 Smith was the co-chairman of the
Greater Philadelphia Movement, which, like the C.A.C., "is composed of im-
portant men in the business community who are dedicated to the support of the
redevelopment program."1
03
The group returned to New Haven, enthused about urban renewal: "There
were no lukewarm supporters of New Haven's redevelopment project on the
return trip home last night. If there were they were not apparent."'104 The
Journal Courier reported that the group represented "all segments of commu-
nity life," but referred to the group as consisting only of men, and like the
C.A.C., all members of the group identified in the article came from govern-
ment or business.10
5
Philadelphia's urban renewal program included razing a tract of land a mile
long and several hundred feet wide, a site that was to become Penn Center and
included a Sheraton hotel, office buildings, a transportation center and a Penn-
sylvania Railroad suburban station building. 10 6
A picture accompanying the article describing the trip showed one of
Philadelphia's newest Housing Authority projects, which can only be described
as the antithesis of Lee's and Logue's vision: a fifteen-story apartment building
containing 448 family units and a twelve-classroom elementary school and







106. Mile Section of Philadelphia Is Leveled for Redevelopment, NEW HAVEN J.-COURIER,
February 12, 1955.
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other facilities. The development also contained "dwellings situated in
rows."
10 7
In their two articles describing the trip, the Journal Courier appears as
much cheerleader as newspaper. Apparently taking to heart Mayor Lee's call
for community-wide support of the proposed urban renewal program, the paper
goes to great lengths to note the importance of the involvement of McGinnis
and the railroad, as well as the similarities between Philadelphia and New Ha-
ven, and mentioning, but minimizing the difference in size between the two
cities. 1°8 Implicit in stressing McGinnis' support was the hope that the railroad
would be as active in reinvesting in New Haven as it had been in Philadelphia.
The difference in size, population, and public and private resources be-
tween Philadelphia and New Haven may make comparison seem incongruous.
As detailed throughout this paper, however, New Haven was and remains a
microcosm of larger deteriorating cities. The flaw in the comparison between
the two cities was not in size, but in the critical elements of the urban renewal
plan. Philadelphia razed a large section of its downtown in order to create a
new business-oriented center, which brought more people downtown and in-
creased Philadelphia's tax base. While New Haven's plan had some of the
same elements, such as the Oak Street connector, a high-speed highway, and
the removal of hundreds of families from the area, the separation of a major
portion of the city from downtown greatly impeded pedestrian and vehicular
traffic trying to cross the new highway. Philadelphia sought to bring people
into the central area. While New Haven's Church Street project had the same
goals, the Oak Street connector was dedicated to moving people in and out of
the city, while separating much of the community from the commercial area.
In Rotival's terms, the concentration on traffic ignored the effects on the rest of
the organism. However, the Oak Street connector had other purposes.
By the early 1950s, the thriving largely Russian-Jewish Oak Street neigh-
borhood had changed dramatically. The majority of the Jews had moved
westward, populating Westville (the western part of New Haven) and the
neighboring towns of Woodbridge and Orange. Of the 694 dwelling units
identified in the Oak Street area, only twenty-nine were occupied by their
owners. 1°9 The population was approximately fifty percent black.11 Little had
been done to maintain the neighborhood, including installing modem plumbing
and electrical systems, and the buildings had deteriorated. Oak Street was a
prime site for urban renewal. The fact that Oak Street was ideally located for
the expressway that Mayor Lee and Maurice Rotival saw as necessary to bring
people in and out of the center city increased the attraction of building a major
107. Id.
108. See generally supra notes 100-106.
109. RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER, THE POLITICS OF PROGRESS 267 (1974).
110. Id.
1997]
HeinOnline  -- 16 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 287 1996-1997
SAINTLOUIS UNIVERSITYPUBLICLAWREkIEW
highway there.
Lee's vision of urban renewal included razing severely blighted areas.
There is no question that the Oak Street area had become a slum in that it con-
sisted of several square blocks of substandard and inadequate housing with se-
rious vermin and other health problems. At the same time, it was a neighbor-
hood containing hundreds of families, most of which were black.
Richard Lee was considered an energetic, progressive mayor. He brought
a group of young, bright, idealistic and progressive professionals into city gov-
ernment, Ed Logue foremost among them. They were well aware of the prob-
lems facing the city and had a vision of how to save it. They saw white-flight
as a serious problem. They believed the city was in danger of tipping and set a
high priority on creating conditions which provided incentives for white people
to remain in the city or, in the alternative, at least remove some disincentives to
remaining in the city. The policy decisions that lead to the Oak Street con-
nector cannot be separated from a desire to remove the city's worst eyesore and
replace it with a planned development that would encourage business invest-
ment and make New Haven an attractive option to moving to the suburbs for
people with adequate capital. Most of those people were white.
Local newspapers helped publicize Oak Street's problems. A series of arti-
cles, with vivid pictures, showed littered streets, vacant stores, heaps of trash,
and apartments with falling plaster, newspapers and cardboard tacked to the
walls and ceiling with lighting furnished by a single light bulb attached by a
dangling wire.
If there were any objections to the Oak Street redevelopment, the media
was not reporting them. During July of 1955, the Journal Courier reported
that city departments were distributing a journal explaining new development
terms. The Union and New Haven Trust Company, which prepared the jour-
nal, mailed it to 10,000 bank customers. The journal credited the New Haven
Chamber of Commerce and the Citizens Action Commission for "crystallizing
public opinion behind the development plan and obtaining the additional leg-
islative and financial aid to take the plan out of the dream stage and get tangi-
ble results readily available to the city's tax payers."
111
Later that same month, the New Haven Register, in a series of articles de-
tailing the nature of the Oak Street redevelopment, estimated the total cost at
$17,150,000, of which $14,000,000 would be private investment. The net cost
to the city would be $450,000, with the balance paid by the federal govern-
ment. The plan included four major improvements:
1. Seven hundred apartments and six hundred off-street parking facilities,
at a cost of $7,000,000.
2. A four-story, 1,400 employee office building with 500 off-street park-
S11. City Redevelopment Brings Host of New Terms, Glossary Published, NEW HAVEN J.-
COuRIER, July 8, 1955.
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ing spots, at a cost of $5,500,000.
3. The extension of College Street, which ran through Yale University.
College Street would be extended south to help facilitate traffic toward Oak
Street.
4. Low-rent public housing project or an institutional use of an isolated
triangle in the redevelopment area.'
12
The excitement over Oak Street would soon be dwarfed by a new project.
On June 11, 1957, Mayor Lee announced the most extensive downtown devel-
opment in New Haven's history. 13 The front page of the New Haven Register
was devoted entirely to the redevelopment, with five separate stories. The
Register did not contain its excitement or moderate its role as cheerleader. The
first story below the masthead started as follows:
For New Haven's newsmen, there never was and probably never will be a day
like Tuesday, June 11, 1957. What is undoubtedly the biggest of the many big
stories in the City's centuries-old history 'broke' in the office of Mayor Rich-
ard C. Lee, crowded with the largest assembly ofjournalists ever to gather here
for a press conference.
To a man-and to a woman, too, for there were 'newshens' present--4he re-
porters and news executives knew that the Mayor was going to announce rede-
velopment of the Church Street area. Not many were not aware of the stag-
gering scope of the projects and its many intriguing details.
114
The downtown redevelopment, which would take five years, would liter-
ally change New Haven's skyline. Hundreds of buildings would disappear, to
be replaced by "glimmering new buildings of metal and brick. The most im-
pressive will be the eighteen-story 'baby skyscraper' which will give the City a
new hotel and a new skyline."'" 5 The project was estimated to cost a total of
$18,000,000. "Unfortunately," the Register noted, "as was the situation in
isolated incidents during the demolition phase of the Oak Street redevelop-
ment, some of the businesses, mostly the smallest and weakest ones, will not
survive.
' 1 16
The biggest investor was Roger L. Stevens, a New York developer and a
producer of Broadway plays. Stevens was to build the hotel, adjacent office
buildings and retail shopping outlets on a prime piece of New Haven real es-
tate--directly across from New Haven Green. Steven's tie to New Haven was
through the Shubert Theater, where several of his plays had tryouts. Steven's
walks through the downtown business district, which the Shubert borders,
112. Oak Street Cost Estimated At $17 Million; Private Capital Would Invest $14 Million,
NEW HAVEN REG., July 25, 1955.
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convinced him that New Haven had potential for investment.1 7
Mayor Lee said the project would not only combat "urban decentraliza-
tion" but would "regain the title we lost in 1930 as Connecticut's first city."
11 8
Lee praised Maurice Rotival for planning the project, but cautioned that the
Plan needed the support of the people if it were to move beyond a plan and be-
come reality." 9 Lee also saw the project as having a leveraging effect: "We
expect there will be a substantial improvement in properties around the project
as a result of new investment within the project areas. This has been the expe-
rience in other cities and I am confident that New Haven will not be an excep-
tion."'120 Lee felt that the project, including improved roads allowing better ac-
cess to downtown New Haven, would make New Haven "the entire focus of
shoppers throughout the New Haven area."
121
By early 1958, Federal Housing Administrator Albert M. Cole described
New Haven's urban renewal program as "spectacular, imaginative, excifing-a
model for urban renewal in the nation's cities."'122 The New Haven Program
was the largest in the country, as determined by dollars expended per capita.
New Haven was to receive $26,056,822 in federal urban renewal funds.123
New Haven's success was described as replacing "a jumble of dark, rat-
infested, debris-cluttered canyons of filth, poverty and disease" with a path for
a six-lane, mile-long traffic artery.
124
When the flesh was put on the skeleton of the development plan, Lee had
scored another coup: Macy's agreed to anchor the mall. In order to accommo-
date Macy's, Malleys, a local family-owned department store, agreed to give
up its prime space to Macy's, moving to a location just south of Macy's, along
the new Oak Street connector. The result was the Chapel Street Mall, the sec-
ond indoor mall in the country, facing the New Haven Green. Alongside was
an office tower and the adjacent Park Plaza Hotel. Macy's was a block south,
connected to the Chapel Square Mall by a walkway. Macys occupied the full
block, with Malley's across the street, also connected by a walkway.
125
With Macys as an anchor, it seemed as though the long-term health of
New Haven as a retail center was guaranteed. "Long-term" turned out to be
less than thirty years. Malley's, isolated by its location, closed in January 1982






122. NEW HAVEN REG., Feb. 9, 1958.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. For a full discussion of the details of the coming of Macy's, Malley's and the Chapel
Square Mall, see TALBOT, supra note 75, at 122-33.
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Company, filed for bankruptcy and closed all fifty Malleys. The New Haven
store had been operating for 129 years. 126 Macy's closed its doors in June
1993, twenty-nine years after opening. 127
By the end of 1993, sales at the Chapel Square Mall were down by one-
third. 128 The mall management blamed the mall's problems on the hundreds of
teenagers who congregated in and outside the mall after school. Patrons stated
that they did not feel safe and that drug-dealing occurred in and outside the
mall.1 9 Mall management proposed banning teens after school, but abandoned
their plan after strenuous objections from many in New Haven, including the
Mayor.1
30
By this time, Malley's was a vacant eyesore and, along with the uniquely
unattractive New Haven Coliseum, served as the first view of New Haven for
people entering from 1-95 via the Oak Street connector. Malleys, a stark
building, was attractive to graffiti artists. Those driving by were treated to slo-
gans like, "HELP! Bang! Bang! New Haven's Children Cry."
By then, John DeStefano was the Mayor. Like Richard Lee, DeStefano
was young, energetic and progressive. Unlike Lee, he was not well-connected
in Washington and, given the changing times, could not depend on money
from the federal government. DeStefano's plan, the Livable City Initiative, dif-
fered from prior plans in two notable ways: (1) It focused on neighborhoods
and not downtown; and (2) it acknowledged that New Haven was a shrinking
city. The Livable City Initiative was a program of measured demolition.
131
The program included identifying blighted buildings, involving neighborhood
"management teams" in the decision of whether to demolish a particular struc-
ture and sought innovative ways to use the vacant lot. One prominent use was
to divide the lot in half and convey the halves to the adjoining land owners,
with an agreement not to build, other than to provide off-street parking. Liv-
able Cities Initiative was a dramatic 1990's response to a declining population
and the failures of the 1980's In-Fill Program.1
3 2
IV. THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN NEW HAVEN
In 1937, seeking to stimulate a moribund construction industry, Congress
passed the United States Housing Act, which created the United States Hous-
ing Authority and provided for loans to be made to local housing authorities to
126. N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1982.
127. Across the USA: News From Every State, U.S.A. TODAY, June 16, 1993, at 7A.
128. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1993.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. The Livable City Initiative (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Saint Louis Univer-
sity Public Law Review and with the author).
132. Id.
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develop local projects.133 By the end of 1938, thirty-three states passed ena-
bling legislation and 221 local authorities were established. New Haven
proved particularly adept in securing federal loans. On July 11, 1939, the New
Haven Board of Aldermen approved the creation of a housing authority and,
shortly thereafter, in an act that the New Haven Register called "[a]nother big
stride toward a slum clearance project in this city," Mayor John W. Murphy
announced the appointment of the first members of the New Haven Housing
Authority.'
34
The first board included Dr. C. E. A. Winslow, a chaired Professor of
Public Health at Yale University; James W. Hook, President of the Geometric
Tool Company; Elizabeth Fox, the Executive Director of the Visiting Nurse
Associate and an Associate Professor of Nursing at Yale University; George
Crawford, a prominent black New Haven attorney and former special counsel
for the City of New Haven; and James F. Welsh, the business agent for the lo-
cal brick layers union. The Register reported that the Mayor had some diffi-
culty in appointing a board because of the heavy responsibility involved, with
indications that Commissioners Winslow and Hook ("one of New England's
leading industrialists") would serve only in the early stages of developing ini-
tial projects.135
Within a year, the Housing Authority completed a plan to house 1,600
low-income residents in thirty-three separate buildings with 442 dwelling units,
"designed to effect a maximum of efficiency in minimum maintenance costs,
all for $2.5 million. That first project, built on the edge of the deteriorated,
largely black Dixwell community that bordered on Yale University, was
known as Elm Haven.
136
When we look at large-scale housing projects like Elm Haven, we wonder
why planners did not see the socio-economic effects that seem so obvious to-
day. In 1940, however, planners saw a different environment, with three sepa-
rate benefits from building large-scale low-income housing projects. First, by
building the project on the edge of a slum, the project would serve as a barrier
to prevent the slum from expanding into adjoining neighborhoods. Second, the
project would create a ready market for businesses springing up on its out-
skirts. Third, the project would provide high-quality sanitary housing for
families moving from some of the worst housing in the city. 137 The New Ha-
ven Register described the proposed project as "[a] modem utopia... [b]uilt to
provide efficiency, economy, cleanliness and comfort ... .,138 Elm Haven,
133. United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (1937).
134. Mayor Selects Authority for Slum Project, NEW HAVEN REG., Aug. 21, 1939.
135. Id.
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was designed with "community and recreational facilities for adults-long or-
ganized as a need in such projects. '0 39 The Housing Authority's Executive Di-
rector explained that management personnel and "the financial set-up will as-
sure a high standard of maintenance.' 40 He predicted that at the end of the
sixty year amortization period [2001] "the project should be just as good as the
day it is completed.'
141
In addition, federal policy encouraged the development of large projects.
The statute required the elimination of a slum unit for each new unit built. 42
That had two dramatic effects: (1) public housing would be built under the
1937 Act only in those cities with substantial numbers of housing units so de-
teriorated as to merit demolition; and (2) the new housing was likely to be built
in high density on the site of the demolished housing or on large parcels of va-
cant land. 143  Since the establishment of local authorities was voluntary,
wealthier communities without deteriorated housing could avoid building any
public housing.
A move into Elm Haven was unquestionably a step up. The initial tenants
were hand-picked by the Housing Authority to move into Elm Haven from
sub-standard homes considered by the Housing Authority to be unfit for resi-
dential occupancy. Units were limited to families with annual incomes be-
tween $550 and $1,500. Prospective tenants applied at the Housing Authority
office and needed to be certified as financially eligible and as occupants of
crowded or sub-standard housing. If an applicant met those standards, his ap-
plication was turned over to a three-person advisory committee representing
the city's charities, the businessmen, and the clergy, for any further investiga-
tion.
Newspaper articles featured John Jones and his family as typical of the
first tenants to move into Elm Haven. Jones was employed at the Coppers
Coke Company, with an annual income $1,421. His initial rent for 5 rooms
was $35 per month. The Jones family was at the upper end of income eligibil-
ity. The average annual income of the first group of tenants was $975.81.144
Race was a factor from the beginning in planning New Haven's low-
income housing. A tenant survey of the Dixwell slum which was to be demol-




142. Pub. L. No 75-412, § 10(a), 50 Stat. at 891-92. The New Haven Register, May 1942,
explained that the Housing Authority's low-rent projects had not "swelled the number of dwelling
units available since restrictions make it mandatory that a substandard unit be demolished or re-
habilitated for each new unit built."
143. See Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go From Here? 60 U.
Cm. L. REV. 497, 504 (1993).
144. NENVHAVENREG., Sept. 1940.
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living in sub-standard housing, and 425 white families, 210 of which were in
sub-standard housing.145 In order to accommodate a project the size of Elm
Haven, the demolition plans spared nothing, including the many small business
on the east side of Dixwell Avenue. 46 A January 1940 aerial photograph
shows a neighborhood of three story houses, to be replaced by thirty-three low-
rise, flat-roofed buildings. 47 While the project as a whole was integrated, in-
dividual buildings were racially segregated.
148
Quinnipiac Terrace and Famam Courts, both planned along with Elm Ha-
ven in 1939, were completed in 1941. Quinnipiac Terrace, built along a pris-
tine section of the Quinnipiac River in Fair Haven (the eastern-most section of
New Haven) was vigorously opposed by the Clinton Civic Association, a local
neighborhood group. 149 The New Haven Board of Aldermen approved the
project and the closing of four streets in spite of the protests, and Quinnipiac
Terrace opened in November of 1941.150 Like Elm Haven, rents for the three-
to six-room apartments were based on income, with a maximum yearly income
of $1,575. Rents ranged from $17.50 to $28.50 per month.I5 1 Newspaper sto-
ries celebrating the new project called for more housing to make New Haven a
"truly American city" and showed pictures of families (all of whom were
white) moving into Quinnipiac Terrace, noting that "neither the Quinnipiac In-
dians nor the Pilgrim fathers who founded New Haven could boast the com-
forts to be found today in Quinnipiac Terrace." Some of the families were
dressed as Pilgrims, to celebrate the anniversary of treaties with the Quinnipiac
Indians. 1
52
Famam Courts, which was built along Grand Avenue, approximately half
way between Elm Haven and Quinnipiac Terrace, contained 318 units. 153
Construction started in April 1941.54 As construction began, Viva E. Bruce,
the social service director of the New Haven Department of Charities, reported
that "it is impossible to find decent housing and increasingly difficult to find
any housing whatsoever."'155 Mayor Murphy informed the Capital Board of
Finance of a recent eviction of a family of nine. The family had been living in
145. NEW HAVEN REG., July 25, 1939.
146. Id.
147. See NEW HAVEN REG., supra note 144.
148. Matthew Klein, The Development of Scattered Site Housing in New Haven: A Process
of Conflict (Apr. 12, 1993) (unpublished History Senior Essay, Yale University, on file with the
Saint Louis University Public Law Review and with the author).
149. NEW HAVEN REG., Nov. 1940
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Quinnipiac Terrace, Low-Rent Community In Fair Haven, Holding Open House Today,
NEW HAVEN REG., Nov. 23, 1941.
153. Id.
154. Work Starts Tomorrow on Housing Unit, NEWHAVENREG., Apr. 3, 1941.
155. NEW HAVEN REG., Apr. 1941.
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a four-room flat, paying a rental of ten dollars per month for an apartment
which was, according to an investigator, "in need of repairs." The parents and
four children were taken in by relatives; three other children were placed in an
institution, "to await uniting of the family at some future time. 156 Ms. Bruce
reported to members of the New Haven Social Workers' Club that, for families
whose residences were condemned by the Department of Health as unfit for
habitation, "there is just no place for them to go." 157
As of March 31, 1941, New Haven reported a vacancy rate of 1.078% of
the 44,000 dwelling units in the city, with many families paying monthly rent-
als in excess of $40 per month. 15 The Department of Charities increased the
amount it paid for rent assistance for poor families from $1 to $5 per month, in
a futile attempt to alleviate the problem. 59
The Housing Authority advertised Farnam Courts has a model of careful
planning and effective land use. By building eleven separate three-story
apartment buildings, many of them U-shaped wing apartments with open
courtyards, as opposed to the common site arrangements which provided for
"wasted" backyard space, Farnam Court would provide for 318 units on the
same land which had previously housed sixty fewer families, thus increasing
density from thirty-one families per acre to forty families per acre. 16 The pro-




With the completion of Elm Haven, Quinnipiac Terrace and Farnam Court,
the Housing Authority could report the creation of over 1,000 low-income
units in less than three years, all pursuant to a $5,000,000 federal loan. Dr.
Winslow reported that "the contrast with the present bad housing is obvious.
A much more desirable living arrangement has been obtained by the effective
use of land."162 Dr. Winslow particularly noted that the valuable property
"along the street front [of Farnam Courts] was not wasted in the present plan as
there was no attempt to cultivate productive gardens except in a few cases
where grapes were grown."163  He added that "the surface only has been
scratched, however, and the problem of bad housing in New Haven is not
solved. More must be done to make this a truly American city."'164 Thus ended
New Haven's first entry into developing public housing.
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creased housing pressures. 165 By late October 1942, B.M. Petitt, Director of
the Housing Authority, announced that the Authority was interviewing
"eligible in-migrant war workers" to occupy the 300-unit West Hills Defense
Housing Project, the first project to be built in the western end of the city.
Rents at West Hills ranged from $35 for a one-bedroom apartment to $44.50
for a four-bedroom apartment, including utilities. Eligible tenants had to be
employed in a war industry approved by federal authorities, must have come to
New Haven within the past year or be commuting, and must have been living
under unfavorable housing conditions. The federal government funded the
project so that New Haven would be better able to attract workers who other-
wise would not accept jobs in the city.166
Dr. Winslow, responding to "wide spread inquiries as to whether Negro
defense workers are to be discriminated against" in West Hills, stated that such
discrimination would be "unthinkable."'167 Dr. Winslow expressed his pride in
"the complete absence of any racial discrimination" in the Housing Authority's
programs, noting that more than 330 of the 1,035 available low-rent projects
"are occupied by Negroes-a very large portion of the total but one fully justi-
fied by the special needs of this particular group." Dr. Winslow did not note
that approximately ninety percent of the black tenants resided in Elm Haven in
buildings which were segregated by race. He stressed that black workers
would be represented in the West Hills project in approximately in the same
proportion as they represented of the total in-migrant group of the defense
workers. 168
The problem of housing black defense workers was particularly acute at
Winchester, which was planning to "import an additional large numbers[sic] of
Negro workers to round out their employment rolls."'169 Winchester's officials
visited B.M. Petitt concerning housing policies at West Hills. The housing
shortage in the Dixwell Avenue neighborhood was particularly acute, with sto-
ries that black workers slept in shifts because of a lack of adequate beds or in
their automobiles, sleeping in beds only on weekends when they returned to
their out-of-town homes. 170 Defense manufacturers considered asking the city
to repeal a recently-enacted ordinance regulating trailers and trailer camps. 17
The Housing Authority estimated an influx of 2,700 families into New Haven
by the middle of 1943.172
165. NEW HAvEN REG., Mar. 1941; NEW HAVEN REG., Apr. 1941.
166. West Hills Housing Project to Be Formally Opened Nov. 1, NEW HAVEN REG., Oct. 29,
1942.
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The list of plants approved by the federal government as war industries
provides some sense of the breadth of New Haven's industrial base. The Mor-
alin Firearms Company, the Sargent Company, the Winchester Company, the
Bolton Manufacturing Company, the M.B. Manufacturing Company, the
American Tube Bending Company, the Malleable Iron Fittings Company, the
Safety Car Heating Company, the Wire Rope Corporation of America, Snow
and Nabstedt, the Armstrong Aircraft Corporation, the Armstrong Rubber
Company, the Seamless Rubber Company, the A.C. Gilbert Company, the C.
Cowles Company, the Geometric Tool Company and the Rockbestos Company
were among the approved companies. Mr. Petitt requested that the federal
government approve an additional forty industries where applicants were em-
ployed. 173 Dr. Winslow credited Mayor Murray and the members of the
Housing Authority for anticipating the housing shortage in time to obtain fed-
eral funding.
174
Eighteen months later, Mr. Petitt announced that the Housing Authority
received approval from the Federal Housing Authority to accept as tenants any
veterans who had been discharged from service for at least one year and, more
important at the time, the families of absent servicemen. 17 Around the same
time, Colonel Raymond J. Reeves, commanding officer of the Army Air
Forces Training Command School, made appeal for housing facilities for the
miliary officers and families coming to New Haven for courses at Yale. Colo-
nel Reeves reported that approximately ten officers and five families arrived in
New Haven each week, with immediate housing needs. In reporting Colonel
Reeves' comments, the New Haven Register noted that the Yale Service Bu-
reau, the YWCA Room Registry and the New Haven Real Estate Board were
the proper places to apply; the Chamber of Commerce, which received many
requests for assistance, was not able to maintain a registry.176
At the same time, there was a lack of consensus as to the housing needs in
the black community. The New Haven Register reported that recent layoffs,
brought about by changes in production schedules in some of New Haven's
largest war-related indutries, had slightly eased the housing crunch for black
families, noting that "a percentage of those that were let out were Negroes
[who] had left their families in New York and other cities within weekend
commuting distances. When released they gave up their furnished rooms in-
stead of seeking other employment in this area and returned to their native
communities. 1 77 George W. Crawford felt that "a considerable portion of the
immigrant workers" left New Haven, although most were single men and
173. NEW HAVEN REG., Oct. 29, 1942.
174. Id.
175. NEW HAVEN REG., Apr. 20, 1944.
176. NEW HAVEN REG., Feb. 5, 1944.
177. NEW HAVEN REG., Apr. 9, 1944.
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women living in rooming houses. 71 Dr. Carter L. Marshal, a Dixwell Avenue
physician practicing near Elm Haven, agreed, noting that those blacks who left
New Haven were roomers and would not affect the housing situation of fami-
lies. 17
9
A Dixwell Avenue realtor stated that the recent layoff at Winchester
helped ease the common doubling and tripling up under one roof, with many
formerly overcrowded families now having separate quarters. Another broker
"specializing in properties in the Negro sections" stated that "the clamor for
rooms let up" but that there were no vacancies in the Dixwell Avenue, Com-
merce Street or Grand Avenue sections of the city. Mr. Petitt noted that black
families were still having a difficult time finding rooms. There were no vacan-
cies at Elm Haven, where sixty-eight percent of the 487 units were occupied by
black families. The availability of rental apartments and houses "in the more
desirable neighborhoods, remain[ed] acute if not desperate."'Is
At the end of World War II the expected exodus of war-time workers did
not occur. With returning veterans and negligible construction of new units, a
November 1945 survey estimated that 3,000 individuals and families were
searching for housing, with an average of only three families per week finding
suitable housing.1s' Anecdotal information included eight families sharing one
kitchen and three families living in five rooms. Local realtors predicted the
housing shortage would get worse before it improved. 8 2 By the spring of
1946, an estimated 2,500 families were seeking housing, while only ninety-
nine permits for family units had been issued, fourteen of which were conver-
sion of third floor attics into apartments. The suburbs of Hamden, East Haven,
North Haven, and West Haven reported an additional 200 permits. Critical
shortages in building materials hampered large-scale construction.1
3
With the newly-formed Citizens Housing Emergency Committee advocat-
ing the needs of war veterans, the Board of Aldermen approved a new zoning
district known as Residence A-l, designed to permit the conversion of large
single-family houses, twenty years or older, into apartments. Yale University
resolved its veterans' housing problems by erecting eighty-three Quonset huts
near the Yale Bowl and thirty-seven huts on Whitney Avenue, all for married,




181. Thousands Hunt For Rents Here But Relatively Few Finding Them, NEW HAVEN REG.,
Nov. 8, 1945.
182. Id.
183. 2500 Seeking Home& In This Area But No Major Relief Has Started, NEW HAVEN REG.,
May 5, 1946.
184. NEWHAVENREG., May 6, 1946.
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ville.8 5 The huts remained until 1955 when the city administration supported
Yale's plans for off-campus apartments for married students."8 6 Meanwhile,
the Housing Authority applied for an $8 million federal allocation to construct
a new low-rent project in the Hill section of New Haven and to extend Elm
Haven and Famam Court. The plan would provide for an additional 1,400 to
1,500 family units."8 7
By early 1949, a New Haven Housing Authority survey showed a need in
the city for 6,952 homes or apartments, approximately 3,000 of which would
replace substandard dwellings. Over seventy percent of applications to the
Housing Authority were from veterans.188 Later that year, the federal govern-
ment allocated funds for 700 low-rent units, which allowed for the planned ex-
pansion at Elm Haven and Famam Court. The proposed project in the Hill still
awaited federal approval. 89 In Washington, the federal Public Housing Ad-
ministration announced that all preliminary loans to plan low-rent projects
must be used in slum and sub-standard areas.190 While federal policy in the
1937 Act encouraged building public housing in deteriorated or vacant areas,
the 1949 Act mandated a process which made inevitable the siting of low-
income projects in poor neighborhoods. The policy was ideal for enlarging al-
ready existing projects like Elm Haven and Farnam Courts. 191
In mid-October 1949, Richard C. Lee, nearing the end of the first of two
unsuccessful runs for Mayor of New Haven, (to be followed by a sixteen year
tenure as Mayor) offered a seven-point housing program, which included con-
solidating the Emergency Housing and Veterans Emergency Housing into the
Housing Authority, conducting a needs survey for all economic levels, encour-
aging private capital projects, encouraging the expansion of ownership housing
in cooperation with private builders, using a "skilled expert" to advise on the
building code currently being drafted, preparing a modem housing code by the
Health Department and providing a community information center through the
Housing Authority.192 Lee's plan foreshadowed his reliance on experts, par-
ticularly planners; his call for more private building, more ownership housing
and consolidation of housing programs within the Housing Authority would
prove to be ironic. The future Mayor Lee would change the New Haven land-
scape through public dollars, with slum clearance, massive redevelopment and
highway construction constituting critical parts of the process.
193
185. Home Is Where You Make It, NEW HAVEN REG., Jan. 12, 1947.
186. City Will Mesh Plans With Yale Expansion, NEW HAVEN L-COURIER, Mar. 15, 1955.
187. NEW HAVEN REG., Apr. 7, 1946.
188. Survey Shows 6,952 Homes Needed In City, NEW HAVEN J.-COURIER, Mar. 30, 1949.
189. Farnam Court and Elm Haven To Be Expanded, NEW HAVEN REG., Nov. 26, 1949.
190. Id.
191. See Schill, supra note 143.
192. NEWHAVEN J. CoURIER, October 19, 1949.
193. See discussion of Urban Renewal, supra notes 110-25 and accompanying text.
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Meanwhile, William C. Celentano was still the Mayor and the Housing
Authority remained the primary builder in New Haven. In mid-1950, the
Housing Authority received bids for the construction of McConaughy Terrace
and Brookside, the city's first two moderate rental projects. Both projects were
built with state funds. Brookside would consist of 300 units, 165 with two-
bedroom apartments, 120 with three-bedroom apartments, and 15 with four-
bedroom apartments. The addition of the four-bedroom apartments was a
break with the past, accommodating families with five or more children.
Given the recent rise in the cost of building materials, units were expected to
cost an average of more than $10,000 each.194
Brookside was a controversial project from its inception. The New Haven
Real Estate Board asked the Board of Aldermen not to approve the Housing
Authority's proposal, listing seven objections:
1. Brookside was too expensive. Tax payers should not have to pay for
the government to build units costing $10,000 each. Over ninety-six percent of
the tax-paying population earned $5,000 or less per year and the group as a
whole paid more than eighty percent of the income taxes collected.
2. The project was an unwise state investment. The realtors predicted that
within a few years, there would be a sizable number of vacancies in the pro-
posed units. Incomes would level off with the end of the current inflationary
spiral and people in the lower income brackets would be unable to afford the
moderate rents at Brookside. In addition, the acceleration of private construc-
tion would bring about a decline in housing costs. The project would run at a
deficit and the state would be responsible for the bill.
3. The units were not planned for low-income families, which had the
greatest need.
4. Too few families would benefit. Even assuming full occupancy, the
proposed 300 units would house less than three-quarters of one percent of the
city's 50,400 families. The realtors felt that this was too small a gain to risk the
financial consequences.
5. There was no evident need. Only 350 people had indicated an interest
in renting the units. Because of the expected decline in the cost of private
housing most of those would probably would not be interested in Brookside
once the units were completed.
6. The basic principle underlying Brookside was unsound. The small
home owner, managing an annual income of $1500 to $2000, should not be
required to help pay the rent for people whose income was double his. People
earning $4000 to $5000 per year should not be subsidized.
7. The destruction of individuality. Large-scale housing uniformity bor-
dered on "machine thinking" and "mass thinking" and was "a swing in the di-
194. Larger Units Are Planned For Brookside, NEW HAVEN REG., July 24, 1950.
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rection of socialism and communism."1 95
Since the first occupants of Levittown had moved in almost two years ear-
lier and Bill Levitt and his "almost identical houses" and homogeneous com-
munity had received national recognition, 196 the realtors' fear of government as
the promulgator of mass-produced design seems incongruous. It is true, how-
ever, that New Haven was a city of attractive and well-constructed one- and
two-family houses. A drive through New Haven and its suburbs today shows
that large-scale projects, i.e., 100 units or more, were generally built in New
Haven by the government and in the suburbs by the private market.
The complaint that Brookside would serve moderate-income instead of
low-income residents reflected a fear of competition from government, since
low-income residents did not provide much of a market, while Brookside's per-
spective tenants would likely to be able to rent or buy other homes. This ar-
gument, too, is reflected today, as New Haven realtors object to subsidizing
competing private developers in an attempt to lure middle-class tenants to New
Haven, as in the current Ninth Square development. 197 That project, however,
was still forty-five years down the road.
The location of Brookside at Springside Farm on a sixty-acre, city-owned
tract was not raised as an issue. Springside Farm was a bucolic spot near the
back of West Rock, which, along with East Rock, are two starkly beautiful
sheer cliffs of glacial deposits. East and West Rocks, New Haven's most dis-
tinctive geologic formations, quite literally marked the spot where a southern
glacier stopped moving and melted. Their beauty can been seen in paintings of
the Hudson River School, where the foreground contains open land and farm
animals, not real estate development. Springside Farm was as isolated as it
was beautiful.
Today, Brookside's population approaches 100% African-American, low-
income families. The racist overtones of selecting such an isolated site seem
obvious. The problem with this analysis is that Brookside's initial occupants
were neither black nor low-income. The project was seen as a means of hous-
ing a largely white, moderate-income worker population.
In planning Brookside, the Housing Authority was not ignoring low-
income families. Less than two weeks after the deadline for construction bids
at Brookside, the Housing Authority announced plans to seek federal funding
for 800 "slum-clearance units." 198 The 81st Congress had enacted the Housing
Act of 1949,199 mandating a six-year program to provide over 800,000 new
195. NEwHAVENREG., Sept. 19, 1949.
196. KENNETHT. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER 234-238 (1985).
197. Comments of Joel Schiavone, a private developer of commercial and residential property
in New Haven, to Yale Law School's Housing and Community Development Clinic, 1994 and
1996.
198. NEWHAVENREG., Aug. 21, 1949.
199. Pub. L. No 81-171, 63 Stat413 (1949).
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low-rent units across the country, through long-term loans by the Public
Housing Administration to local housing authorities. The New Haven Hous-
ing Authority expected to make an additional request for 600 units before the
expiration of the six-year period.200
The Housing Authority's application stated that there were 10,719 New
Haven families living in sub-standard homes, i.e., dwellings which did not
meet minimal requirements of space, safety, utilities or construction. The
Authority stated a need in New Haven for low-rent public housing at rents
within the means of low-income families, especially for families of living or
deceased veterans, whose needs were not being met by the private market.201
The federal government agreed and provided the funding to allow the
Housing Authority to build the Rockview project, also at the Springside site,
adjoining Brookside.202 Rockview contained 202 units of low-income housing
which were built at a cost of $2.5 million. Rockview was the city's fourth low-
rent project and the first to be built in ten years. 20 Tenants began occupying
after Christmas in 1952, with full occupancy expected by mid-February
1953.2 0 In addition to meeting maximum income requirements similar to
those at Elm Haven, Farnam Courts and Quinnipiac Terrace, tenants at
Rockview had to sign affidavits attesting that they were not communists or
member of communist friendly organizations. Recent federal legislation
"bar[red] Reds and their sympathizers from subsidized housing."205  The
Rockview tenants were the first in New Haven to be compelled to sign affida-
vits swearing that they had no communist ties.2 0 6
Although Brookside and Rockview were within a few feet of Woodin
Avenue in the suburb of Hamden, there was no access from Rockview to
Hamden.207 That additional isolation was intentional, further isolating the
residents of Rockview from any sense of greater community. Although reports
state that Woodin Avenue could be extended to Hamden "should traffic re-
quirements warrant it in the future,, 208 a memorandum from HUD's predeces-
sor indicates that the federal government would accede to Hamden residents'
demands to keep the road closed. To this day, that isolation remains; the only
change to the few feet of grass between a street within Rockview and Woodin
Avenue is the addition of a metal fence which prevents pedestrians as well as
200. NEW HAVEN REG., Aug. 21, 1949.
201. Id.
202. First Tenants Begin Moving Into Rockview: Sever Families Entering New Project Un-





207. NEW HAVEN REG., Feb. 11, 1951.
208. Id.; see NEW HAVEN REG., Dec. 29, 1952.
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motor vehicles from entering Hamden.
209
By mid-1951, with the Housing Authority presenting plans for the expan-
sion of Elm Haven and Farnam Courts, public housing found itself in the midst
of a new controversy when the Board of Commissioners of the Hartford
Housing Authority ordered the eviction from low-rent projects those families
found to exceed the income limits for low-rent housing. At a public inquiry,
"ugly charges that [the tenants] gained acceptance through influence were
hurled., 210 The New Haven Journal-Courier asked,
Can such taxpayers be blamed if they raise loud protests over being assessed to
give housing aid to persons whose income may be twice as high as their own?
Can there be any wonder that these taxpayers complain bitterly when they see
some of those who are recipients of their assistance riding around in $2,000 or
$3,000 automobiles and enjoying the entertainment provided by $1,000 or so
television sets while seated on lavish furniture?
211
The Journal-Courier urged a reexamination of the income status of present
tenants before concentrating on expansion.
212
Criticism aside, by the fall of 1952, the Housing Authority released plans,
including an architect's sketch, for a 368-unit expansion of Elm Haven, along
Ashmun, Webster, and Canal Streets. 213 By October, the federal government
approved fumding.214 In order to make maximum use of the land, the Housing
Authority approved a dramatic plan. In contrast to the one- and two-story
public housing buildings throughout New Haven, the Housing Authority
planned two ten-story buildings and four of eight-stories, along with a new
central administration building. The Elm Haven addition would bring to 1,474
the number of low-rent units in New Haven, with an additional 900 moderate-
rent units. The proposed cost for the extension was $4,750,000.215
In October 1953, the Register reported that "wrecking crews during the
past week launched an attack on houses in the Winchester School area which
are to be torn down to clear a site" for the Elm Haven extension.216 Seventy
houses occupied by 130 families resided in the demolition area which was near
a new factory being built by Winchester Repeating Arms Company to join ex-
isting buildings.
217
209. The fence is visible at the site. It is kept in good repair.
210. NEW HAVEN J.-COURIER, July 28, 1951
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Architect's Sketch of $4,750,000 Project Planned in Elm Haven, NEW HAVEN REG.,
Sept. 22, 1952.
214. U.S. Signs Contracts For 372 Elm Haven Units, NEW HAVEN REG., Oct. 9, 1952.
215. Id.
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The extension was not occupied until early 1955. Tenants were admitted
to the new units based on income level and need. Some of the applicants were
from the Oak Street redevelopment. Approximately 100 families from Oak
Street were eligible to apply for housing at Elm Haven.218 The Oak Street ap-
plicants received the top priority for vacancies 219
The elevator in the buildings stopped at the fourth and seventh floors.
Tenants on other floors reached their apartments by walking up or down one
flight of stairs.221 Apartments larger than one bedrooms had balconies. The
floors served by the elevators contained coin-operated washers and dryers.
The floors were covered with asphalt tile.
221
The Register reported that "[c]ommittees of the Council of Social Agen-
cies and the Dixwell Community Council are planning expanding activities
expected to be needed with completion with the project. Each new family will
be visited by a representative of the Community Council." 222 The Register did
not report the nature of the services with any greater specificity.
223
In March 1956, Mayor Lee, beginning his second term as mayor and con-
sidered a likely Democratic candidate for Senate in 1958, testified before a
Senate sub-community, urging federal legislation to encourage the construction
of smaller public housing development, including "professional 'social guid-
ance' for development families."224 In a remarkable testimony, Lee foresaw the
problematic future of large public housing projects. Lee predicted that in five
years public housing would be "bigger than ever," but uncontroversial, as soci-
ety recognized the primary function of public housing "to serve as a housing
resource for families displaced by urban renewal and development, housing
code enforcement and urban arterial highway programs."225 Lee felt that local
communities would insist on urban renewal, local housing code enforcement
and the development of freeways, all of which would displace families and
would lead to more public housing.
Lee saw large housing projects becoming more isolated from the commu-
nity, populated by elderly people, single-parent families, families living on
AFDC and other welfare programs, and black families, "because there are
those in our cities and towns throughout America who are not yet American
enough to welcome them as equals and as neighbors."226 Lee urged federal
funding for smaller projects of fifty to seventy five units, housing that, in his
218. New Section of Elm Haven Ready Jan. 1, NEW HAVEN REG., Oct. 18, 1954.
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view, "will not be a threat to anyone. It will be just a part of an over-all pro-
gram of urban renewal and improvement, which will have its major emphasis,
and its major capital expenditures from private enterprise., 227
Only five months later, however, the New Haven Register reported that the
Housing Authority was planning a two hundred unit, $2.5 million state-funded,
moderate-rental housing project on Eastern Street, on the eastern edge of the
city, bordering on East Haven and across from the municipal golf course.2
28
The project was controversial from its conception. The proposed site was pri-
vately owned. The Housing Authority failed to reach an agreement with the
owner and, therefore, instituted condemnation proceedings. The 31st Ward
Citizens Committee also instituted proceedings, contesting the condemnation.
Ultimately, the owner sold the twenty-one acre site to the Housing Author-
ity.
2 2 9
The 31st Ward Citizen's Committee and home owners living across East-
ern Street from the proposed project instituted new litigation to stop the proj-
ect. In April of 1958, following a year delay, the second of the two suits was
resolved in the favor of the Housing Authority, allowing the construction of
the $2.434 million, 154 moderate-rental units.230
New units aside, the basic theme in late 1970 was no different than it had
been for the past thirty years. New Haven faced a housing shortage that was
described as a "crisis of monumental proportions" that was "a fact of life that
Elm City dwellers lived with and accepted as a part of their existence. '231 Ed-
ward White, Jr., the Executive Director of the Housing Authority, character-
ized New Haven's housing crisis as being as bad as any other city in the coun-
try, caused in part by the dwelling units lost to urban renewal, construction of
highways throughout the city, and creation of student housing by Yale and
Southern Connecticut State Universities.
232
In October 1970, New Haven had 1,662 units of low-income, federally as-
sisted family housing, 742 units of state-assisted, moderate-income family
units, 300 units leased by New Haven from the private sector for low-income
families, and 140 units of planned low-income housing-a total of 2,852 units,
as well as an additional 600 public housing units for the elderly. 233 Although
there were an additional 2,000 families on the Housing Authority waiting list,
White urged construction of additional elderly housing, stressing that any new
family housing project would be fifty-five units or smaller, and noting that,
227. Id.
228. 200-Apartment Project Plannedfor Eastern St., NEW HAVEN REG., Aug. 10, 1956.
229. Housing Authority buys Site on Eastern Street, NEW HAVEN REG., May 2, 1957.
230. NEW HAVEN REG., Apr. 22, 1958.
231. Harvey Austes, Lack of Housing-A Major Crisis For New Haven, NEW HAVEN REG.,
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"[b]efore this we didn't build smaller than 200 units. When people think of
public housing, they think of things like Elm Haven with over 800
units ... and this is what we are trying to get away from--that city within a
city affect., 234 White noted a traditional pattern of in-migration from rural
southern communities to urban southern communities and then north to cities
like New Haven created "a virtual insatiable demand for housing., 235
Despite all the talk of smaller projects, 1971 saw two large, highly visible
projects: Bella Vista, a proposed 1,400 unit complex for the elderly and Ori-
ental Masonic Gardens (OMG), perhaps New Haven's best-known project
since Elm Haven. Both projects were privately owned and publicly subsidized.
OMG, the third project to be built at the Springside Farms site, was con-
sidered an experiment in "instant housing." OMG was funded by HUD
through section 236 of the National Housing Act.236 Consisting of factory-
built, modular townhouses, the project was problematic from its conception.
On March 16, 1970, New Haven Mayor Bartholomew Guida announced that
the 230 modular units would be leaving the manufacturer's plant that day and
would shortly arrive in New Haven. Two days later, only two units arrived on
the site. When the units did arrive, they did not meet the current building code
requirement of a two-inch fire wall between each unit. The walls had to be
237
added at the site.
In January 1971, when the general contractor finally completed the project,
the city rejected the application for a certificate of occupancy because of nu-
merous housing code violations. The developer requested an additional
$230,000 from HUD "to meet changing requirements, to correct oversights,
and to improve the project., 238 HUD rejected the request.239
By mid-April 1971, twenty-seven of the thirty-seven clusters of units had
received temporary certificates of occupancy. Outstanding problems included
landscaping, grading, and "hundreds of electrical violations." 240
OMG was designed by Paul Rudolph, Dean of the Yale School of Archi-
tecture. HUD praised Rudolph's design "as the vision of the housing projects
of the future."241 Rudolph viewed the modules and clusters as representing a




236. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1994).
237. Oriental Masonic Gardens About Ready for Occupation, NEW HAVEN REG., Apr. 25,




241. TOM WOLFE, FROM BAUHAUS TO OURHOUSE 74-75 (1981).
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The project also looked different from previous worker or public housing.
The modules, which were blue, were particularly modem, with barrel-vaulted
living rooms. The rounded roofs, which were quite visible, were covered with
a teflon-like material, so that dirt would not adhere, allowing the rain to wash
them clean.
243
Unfortunately water accumulated where the roofs met the walls; the mod-
ules did not fit together well.244 The combination of these problems caused se-
rious leaking. When roofing material was applied to the roof in an attempt to
make repairs, it did not adhere to the roofs any better than the dirt had. The
roofing material washed off in the rain. 24  In addition, the landscaping prob-
lems had never been resolved. After each heavy rain fall, OMG was a mud
hole. The modules were sinking into the mud.247 In 1977, HUD became
mortgagee in possession, taking title a year later.248 By the end of the 1970s,
tenants were leaving OMG. In 1979, a federal district court characterized the
living conditions at OMG as "intolerable. " 249 The district court enjoined HUD
from collecting rent. By early 1980, more than half of the units were vacant
and boarded up. Many units had been gutted by fire and vandalism and the
community center "was nothing more than a skeletal frame."251 By September
1980, there were only seventeen tenants left
252
Inside the occupied units, water poured down the inside of the walls, elec-
trical sockets shorted out, water pooled on the floors, and tiles curved at the
edges and lifted. In the upstairs rooms, there were gaps between the wall and
the ceiling with water pouring through. Tiles had loosened and been removed,
253leaving plywood floors. HUD's response was to demolish the project two
years later, in 1981.254
The state of the city's housing in the late 1970s seemed reminiscent of the
early 1940s. While the city's rental vacancy rate was six percent, more than
half of the available units were substandard, according to the Housing Assis-
tance Plan (HAP) submitted to HUD as part of the city's Community Devel-
243. Interview with Michael 0. Sheehan, Attorney for the Oriental Masonic Gardens Tenants
Association [hereinafter Sheehan]. Mr. Sheehan represented the Tenant Association in litigation
against HUD, Techer v. Roberts-Harris, 83 F.R.D. 124 (1979).
244. WOLFE, supra note 241, at 83.
245. Sheehan, supra note 243; Techer, 83 F.R.D. at 125.
246. Jonathan Harr, Anatomy of a Housing Project's Failure, NEW HAVEN ADVOCATE, Mar.
7, 1979.
247. Id.
248. Techer, 83 F.R.D. at 125.
249. Id. at 131.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. WOLFE, supra note 241, at 83.
253. Id.
254. Sheehan, supra note 243; Techer, 83 F.R.D. at 125.
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opment package."' More than 1,000 families were living in apartments that
were substandard and not suitable for rehabilitation. 6
The city's major housing policy was the Neighborhood Preservation Pro-
gram (NPP), which loaned funds to owners in target areas with high concen-
trations of owner-occupied housing, but from 1976 to 1978, more than twice as
many units had been abandoned as the city helped preserve under the NPP.
257
Annual property loses due to fire had doubled in the past ten years, with the
increase disproportionate among old wood-frame buildings in low-income
neighborhoods. Most of the loses were insured, but the buildings not re-
258placed . The 1977 New Haven Fire Department Annual Report listed more
than sixty percent of the city's fires as "suspicious. 259 The Redevelopment
Agency identified 1,390 units of vacant or abandoned housing in 1976.260 A
year and a half later, the City Building Department identified an additional 595
abandoned units. 261 The waiting list for public housing surpassed 2,000 fami-
lies for a total of 4,300 units.
262
By late 1983, the Elm Haven high-rises were a disaster. Mayor Biagio
DiLieto suggested razing the high-rises because of their bad condition and be-
cause they were inadequately designed for families with children.263 A team of
experts, designated the Elm Haven Design Charrette ("Charrette"), spent four
days studying Elm Haven to devise a solution to "New Haven's worst public
housing problem.'"264 They recommended that a street bordering the high-rises
be expanded to create a wide, landscaped boulevard, that three of the high-
rises be demolished, that one be renovated as housing for the elderly and the
other two retained.265 The high-rises were described as "dilapidated" with
"broken windows, dark urine-soaked hallways covered with graffiti and bullet
holes, [and] garbage-strewn lots."266 In some of the buildings, there was in-
adequate heat and hot water, while in others the water was scalding. The heat
and hot water problem was resolved only after the tenants, represented by the
local legal services program, filed suit. The Charrette recommendation be-








263. Janet Koch, Report Details Elm Haven Strategy: Experts Urge Razing 3 High-Rise,
NEW HAVEN REG., Dec. 11, 1983, at2.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Paul Bass, A New Elm Haven Pipe Dream or Pragmatic Plan?, NEW HAVEN AD-
VOCATE, Nov. 11, 1984.
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came known as "the Boulevard Plan."267
At the same time, the New Haven Register, reporting on crime in public
housing, wrote:
[T]he hallways of the Elm Haven public housing project high-rise apartments
are havens for drug dealers and thieves, tenants say. The Brookside Projects
provide easy pickings for criminals bent on breaking and entry. Some of the
elderly residents at the William T. Rowe Towers are afraid to leave their
apartments and venture out into the street for fear they'll be mugged, according
to tenants. At the Farnam Courts project, one of the most popular forms of
outdoor recreation for youngsters is a floating craps game.
268
By this time, more than 16,000 people lived in the Housing Authority's thirty-
269two housing projects. Many of the projects were reserved for the elderly
and had been built between 1962 and 1974.
According to a Housing Authority spokesperson, there were very few
crime problems in 1940 when Elm Haven first opened. 27  Admission was se-
lective, management was strict and tenants were fined for littering or failing to
put trash out. According to the spokesperson, that changed in the 1960s, when
authoritarian structure broke down.271 The Housing Authority Executive Di-
rector, Linda Evans, insisted, however, that crime in the public housing proj-
ects was similar to economically distressed areas of the city.
272
In 1989, the Housing Authority requested and HUD approved the demoli-
tion of all six Elm Haven high-rises, a total of 366 units. 273 When little was
done concerning replacing the demolished units, tenants, Housing Authority
waiting-list applicants and social service agencies brought suit against the
Housing Authority and HUD. As part of a settlement, the parties agreed to the
Elm Haven Replacement Plan, which provided for the development of 183
public housing units and 183 project-based Section 8 rental units within a six
274year period. The settlement required the new units be scattered, in nonra-
cially-impacted neighborhoods. 27s In the low-rises, only one percent of the
families earned more than $15,000 per year.276 The population of Elm Haven
was ninety-eight percent black, with single women heading ninety-two of the
267. Id.
268. Steve Hamm, Crime Reaching Crisis Stage In City's Housing Projects, NEW HAVEN





273. See Settlement Agreement at 2, Christian Community Action, Inc. v. Cisneros, No.
3:91CV00296 (AVC) (D. Conn. 1995).
274. Id. at n.252.
275. Id.
276. NEW HAVEN REG., May 26, 1985.
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households.
277
In 1992, the Housing Authority began buying properties for the scattered-
site program. The Housing Authority had purchased twelve buildings by Sep-
tember 1992, when one was burned by an arsonist. That building was located
"in middle-class, mostly white Morris Cove" in the eastern-most section of the
city.27s Opposition to the scattered-site program was intense. 279 At public
hearings, the New Haven Register noted that "[n]o single issue in this city, save
the property revaluation that sent tax bills into orbit last spring, has engendered
a more intense reaction from homeowners. '280 Public support was muted and
Mayor John Daniels, New Haven's first (and only) African-American mayor,
joined the opposition. Ultimately the houses purchased by the Housing
Authority were occupied.
Meanwhile, HUD granted the Housing Authority $46,000,000 to rede-
velop Elm Haven's low rises. After five years of planning, tenants were being
relocated in anticipation of demolition. The plan was to develop a mixed-
income project, lower density and provide for some home ownership.
As 1996 drew to a close, New Haven was waiting for the results of HUD's
investigation of alleged improprieties of the Housing Authority. Confidence in
the Housing Authority was virtually nonexistent. Perhaps in recognition of its
own deficits, the Housing Authority contracted with HOME, Inc., a private
nonprofit organization, to manage the new scattered-site programs.
281
V. REINVENTING HUD AND FUTURE SHOCK
Any discussion of the future of public housing starts with the Clinton Ad-
ministration's Blueprint for Reinventing HUD, a proposal to transform all ex-
isting federal public housing programs into tenant-based housing assistance.
Under the plan, "public housing tenants would become certificate holders and
pubic housing authorities (PHAs) would become ordinary private land-
lords.
, 282
The Blueprint envisions three stages for achieving its objectives. In Stage
1: 1) PHAs would be substantially deregulated, with many currently-existing
tenant rights eliminated; 2) the various public housing funding programs would
be consolidated; and 3) there would be widespread demolition and sale of
277. Id.
278. Josh Kovner, Public Housing Home Torched, NEW HAVEN REG., Sept. 19, 1992, at 1.
279. Id.
280. Josh Kovner, Emotions Raw at Scattered-Site Housing Hearing, NEW HAVEN REG.,
Nov. 18, 1992, at3.
281. For a description of HOME, Inc, see HOMES FOR THE HOMELESS 11-13 (Adam Berger et
al. Eds., 1990).
282. NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT, HUD's 1995 BILL: THE ACPA: A SUMMARY OF
PUBLIC HOUSING PROVISIONS 1 (1995).
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283public housing and an increase in efforts to turn troubled PHAs around. In
Stage : 1) the funding system would be changed to replace operating subsi-
dies and modernization grants with one-year contracts to PHAs for project-
base certificates; and 2) PHAs would be further deregulated, so that new ten-
ants would have lesser rights than Stage I tenants.284 In Stage HI: 1) the proj-
ect-based certificates would become tenant-based, so that tenants could move
elsewhere, and 2) only those tenants who were in PHA buildings at the end of
State I would retain any federal tenants' rights.285 Transformation from tradi-
tional public housing to tenant-based assistance would be phased in over five
years.
The most immediate effect of the Clinton Administration's Blueprint for
Reinventing HUD has been a flash flood of written and oral comment, largely
on the question of privatization. Supporters fall into two camps: an economic
model, arguing that privatizing public housing will be more efficient and cost-
effective,286 and a desegregation model, arguing that privatization will increase
tenant choice, resulting in regional housing mobility, desegregation and im-
proved lives for public housing tenants.8 7 Opponents to privatization stress the
security that public housing provides, including economic security, protection
against displacement, procedural protections, and the absence of discrimination
based on low-income, family status or race. 28 Even those advocating privati-
zation, however, support the continued existence of traditional public housing
in certain circumstances, including where race discrimination prevents poor
minority tenants from having equal access to the private housing market and as
a means to preserve tenant rights.
28 9
There is, however, little empirical information on the critical questions of
mobility or the extent to which a mobile public housing population will affect
public housing projects. In a broader sense, this means we are still experi-
menting, since we have little sense of how to structure a successful housing
policy for low-income people.
In trying to determine what works and what does not, it is worth looking at
several housing programs in St. Louis: Pruitt Igoe, Cochran Gardens, and three




286. See generally Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance:
The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELLL. REV. 878 (1990).
287. See generally Phillip D. Tegeler et al., Transforming Section 8: Using Federal Housing
Subsidies to Promote Individual Housing Choice and Desegregation, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 451 (1995).
288. Shelby D. Greene, The Public Housing Tenancy: Variations of the Common Law That
Gives Security of Tenure and Control, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 681 (1994).
289. Schill, supra note 286.
19971
HeinOnline  -- 16 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 311 1996-1997
SAINTLOUIS UNIVERSITYPUBLICLAWREVIEW
ing Association, St. Louis Association of Community Organizations, and
Ecumenical Housing Production Corporation. 290 Pruitt-Igoe was in many ways
the spiritual ancestor of New Haven's Oriental Masonic Gardens. Built in
1955 as worker housing, Pruitt-Igoe was a massive project of fourteen-story
buildings. Although the project won a design award from the American Insti-
tute of Architects, with covered walkways on each floor, the project was a fail-
ure from its completion. Tenants were not involved in any management deci-
sions until 1971, when a task force asked the few remaining tenants for
suggestions. The tenants suggested the demolition of Pruitt-Igoe. The task
force agreed and in July 1972, the city leveled the multi-block housing project
in an event captured on film. 291
Nearby, Cochran Gardens seemed ripe for a similar fate. However, in Co-
chran Gardens, the tenants turned the project around. In 1986, in a segment
which began with the dramatic demolition of Pruitt-Igoe, CBS's 60 Minutes
profiled Cochran Gardens as a successful project.292 Cochran Gardens, a low-
income high-rise located near Pruitt-Igoe, with a long history of violence and a
population of low-income, African-American, single-parent families, seemed
an unlikely success story. Yet, the 60 Minutes segment showed a clean, at-
tractive and well-managed high-rise, with manicured grounds and play areas.
Morley Safer, the reporter for the segment, noted that he felt a marked lack of
racial hostility at Cochran Gardens, in contrast to other housing projects he had
visited.293
A viewer could identify several reasons for success, including a strong or-
ganizing effort, tenant management, an emphasis on personal responsibility,
community building and massive subsidies. It is worth looking at each of these
factors.
Near the beginning of the 60 Minutes segment, Morely Safer suggested
that the difference between Pruitt-Igoe and Cochran Gardens may be Bertha
Gilkey, the president of the Cochran Gardens Tenant Management Corpora-
tion.2 94 By all accounts, Bertha Gilkey was and remains an extraordinary posi-
tive force. She was not alone. She was supported not only by a strong and ef-
fective Cochran Gardens tenant community, but by an effective legal services
program as well as by other organizers. Their efforts resulted in massive
funding to renovate Cochran Gardens, but did not stop there.
Tenant management was critical to Cochran Gardens' turnaround. Today,
290. Peter W Salsich, Jr. Solutions to the Affordable Housing Crisis: Perspectives on Priva-
tization, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 263, 289 (1995).
291. WOLFE, supra note 241, at 82.
292. 60 Minutes: Tenant Power (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 30,1986).
293. Id.
294. The visual image is wonderful: Safer states that "the difference between this [showing a
visual of Pruitt-Igoe being blown up] and this [a visual of the current Cochran Gardens] may be
this," showing a charismatic and energetic Bertha Gilkey. Id.
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as more and more projects and neighborhoods attempt to establish neighbor-
hood standards, Bertha Gilkey and Cochran Gardens are credited with a shift
in priorities from bricks and mortar to value-based concerns, and attempts to
oust gangs and drugs from the complex.295 Cochran Gardens' management is
notable for its emphasis on family responsibility. At one point in the 60 Min-
utes portrayal, the Cochran Gardens' managers advise an applicant that her
sixteen-year-old sister is not old enough to serve as a babysitter for her chil-
dren. 296 Morely Safer refers to the strict, no-nonsense approach of the tenant
management as seeming more like the Moscow Housing Authority than what
one might expect in the United States.297 During the segment, two families are
evicted because of the actions of their teenage age son; a member of the Tenant
Association Board of Directors explains how she sent her son to live with
298family members in another city in order to avoid eviction.
Bertha Gilkey describes Cochran Gardens as a community, not a project.
Taking that description one step further, it is a community governed by com-
munitarian principles and not individual rights. The tenants take pride in gov-
erning their community more strictly than the St. Louis Housing Authority
governs other projects. In Cochran Gardens, individuals must follow the rules
established by the community. Violation of the rules means eviction. 299
Finally, Cochran Gardens was heavy subsidized, receiving $22.5 million
for renovations.300 As Bertha Gilkey points out, funds for renovations were
only a beginning. "People who urinated in the elevators before the renovation
will still urinate in the elevators after the renovations, unless attitudes are
changed," she noted.30 1 Still, the subsidies to permit the renovations, along
with on-going subsidies to provide for tenant management, were crucial to the
success of Cochran Gardens.
Cochran Gardens may still be the best advertisement in the United States
for tenant management of public housing. At congressional hearings in St.
Louis in June 1996, Bertha Gilkey criticized HUD's plan to demolish 100,000
high-rise apartments, calling instead for more dollars for tenant manage-
ment.30 Representative Christopher Shays, a Connecticut Republican, stated
that "perhaps an empowered resident management program can save some of
these buildings," noting that Cochran Gardens was "one of the best tenant
295. See MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., May 28, 1996 (comments of Harry Boite, Center for







302. Yvonne Samuel, Group Wants to Manage Endangered High-Rises, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, June 4, 1996, at 2B.
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management programs in the country" and "should serve as a model for less
successful programs. 30 3 Gilkey lauded the Cochran Gardens Tenant Man-
agement Corporation for its acquisition of a fifty percent ownership interest in
Blair Apartments, creation of a catering service to supply seven hundred meals
per day for elderly residents, obtaining a ten percent ownership of a local cable
company, and establishing a janitorial service.30 4
Peter Salsich, describing three successful projects, argues that privatization
should be based on community empowerment and effectuated in conjunction
with "social housing," that is, restraints on the future sale of units on the pri-
vate market, such as community land trusts or limited equity housing coopera-
tives.305 Social housing is "a means of preventing gentrification, regulating the
speculative aspects of housing ownership, and providing a realistic opportunity
for low-income households to experience the benefits of ownership."
30 6
The DeSales Mutual Housing Association is a housing cooperative where
residents enjoy lifetime security of tenure and the right to have their family
members receive priority consideration for their units if they should choose to
move. Tenants are active in the governance of the cooperative, including se-
lecting new neighbors, and tenants are subject to cooperative rules. 30  The St.
Louis Association of Community Organizations created a lease-purchase pro-
gram where tenants "who have good prospects for homeownership" enter into
long-term leases with a of their rental payments" funneled into a down-
payment fund for future home-ownership. 308 Finally, the Ecumenical Housing
Production Corporation (EI-IPC) owns and rents out houses in the St. Louis
suburbs to families with Section 8 certificates. EHPC selects its tenants care-
fully and, in addition, provides them with intensive support, which includes
training in housekeeping, budgeting, parenting, and day care, as well as educa-309
tional referrals, and vocational training. Salsich believes that privatization
should be accomplished with the joint involvement of the private sector, the
public sector, and the affected residents, including both public housing benefi-
ciaries and their neighbors. 10
Salsich also argues against excessive deregulation in the privatization of
public housing.311 The Blueprint for Reinventing HUD, he fears, may go too
far in that respect. He argues that a privatization strategy should not eliminate
tenant grievance procedures or "good cause eviction requirements, particularly
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Salsich, supra note 291, at 286.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 289-91.
308. Id. at 291-92.
309. Id. at 293.
310. Id. at 298.
311. Id. at303-04.
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for elderly and disabled tenants who are unlikely compete effectively in the
private housing market.312
The common thread in these successful projects is a resident property or
management interest that guarantees some control over the environment. This
is not surprising: home ownership has long been accepted as a stabilizing fac-
tor in successful neighborhoods. Try an experiment on any beautiful spring or
fall day. Drive or walk through home ownership and rental residential neigh-
borhoods. In a neighborhood dominated by home ownership, people are likely
to be outside, working in yards, planting gardens and doing the never-ending
chores to improve their personal environment. In rental property, the same
people are more likely to be working on their cars or applying their energy
elsewhere. The point is not that people who work on houses are better than
people who work on cars: both types of work require knowledge and industry.
The point is that we are much more likely to improve our own property than
property belonging to someone else. Ownership is the American dream. If we
want to make housing work, either we either have to pay for enough manage-
ment to maintain the property or create enough of a stake so that residents will
maintain the property. If there is a judgment to be made, it is that a well-
maintained housing unit is a greater community benefit than a well-maintained
car.
We also know, however, that home ownership is not a cure-all. New Ha-
ven's In-fill Program was based on home ownership as a means of turning
around neighborhoods. It did not take long for the problems of the neighbor-
hood to dominate the benefits of home ownership. Similarly, failed co-ops are
scattered throughout New Haven. A stake in meaningful governance, whether
through tenant management, limited equity ownership, cooperative ownership
or traditional ownership is an important factor in stabilizing a community, but
will never be sufficient in and of itself as means of changing undesirable
neighborhoods to the point at which people want to tip-in as opposed to tip-
out.
There are other factors, each of which need to be addressed in formulating
a sound housing policy:
1. Privatization---Most of the discussion concerning privatization has re-
volved around mobility plans which enable tenants to leave, with not enough
attention to the majority who will remain. Each tenant who opts to leave will
create a new vacancy. Each vacancy is like a huge broken window, attracting
vandalism and illegal occupancy. If enough people leave, whole buildings will
be demolished, leading to vacant lots which are potentially the biggest broken
windows of them all, ultimately leading to "gap-tooth" neighborhoods where
vacant lots are as common as buildings.
Vacancies prove to be a major tipping factor. To avoid massive numbers
312. Id. at 304.
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of vacancies and large urban wastelands, we need to look to tenant manage-
ment and ownership opportunities in existing public housing. This will neces-
sitate additional subsidies and technical assistance. Without careful, attention
to those who stay (or who are left behind), privatization will accelerate the de-
terioration of cities with large numbers of public housing units.
2. Security--In a recent Sunday edition of New Haven's local newspaper,
the major story, occupying much of the front page, was the release of new
crime statistics. The big news was the narrowing of the gap between the cities
and their suburbs in number of reported crimes. While crime rates were still
higher in Connecticut's cities, the headline emphasized the lack of safety in the
suburbs.
If the perception of unsafe suburbs spreads, we can reliably predict in-
creased efforts by suburban municipalities to change that perception through a
variety of mechanisms, including increasing expenditures for law enforcement.
Security is a critical tipping factor, perhaps even greater than race. (There is
some argument that white-flight is based, in part, on a perceived reduction in
security more than on race per se.) People will not remain in an unsafe situa-
tion unless they have no alternative.
Public housing authorities do not have the option of raising taxes to spend
more on security. Cities like New Haven, which already have higher taxes
than their suburbs, are unwilling to raise taxes to focus increased police power
on housing projects as opposed to city-wide services. Yet, anyone who has
represented public housing tenant groups can attest that the tenants usually ex-
press their highest priority to be a desire for a safe and drug-free environment.
The perception of housing project security is far worse among people living in
private housing, not to mention the views of suburbanites.
The New Haven Housing Authority has over $46 million in federal funds
to redevelop Elm Haven and the Dixwell neighborhood. The goal is not only
to replace housing units, but to lessen density, create home ownership oppor-
tunities and to develop a mixed-income population.
There are a fair number of skeptics who doubt that these goals can be
achieved, asking, "Who would want to live in Elm Haven if they didn't have
to?" Although I take this to be a rhetorical question, I answer, "Lots of peo-
ple." Then I add my provisos, some of which are easy to accomplish and some
of which are not.
Elm Haven is generally described as being part of the largely-African
American Dixwell community near the Yale University campus. We could
just as easily identify Elm Haven as being within a few blocks of the Yale
Gymnasium, Yale Law School, and the Yale Graduate School of Arts and Sci-
ences. If Elm Haven were private housing, it would represent by far the largest
housing stock within easy walking distance of these facilities. Assuming that a
newly-constructed Elm Haven would be physically attractive (that is the easy
part) and that we make a sufficient commitment to addressing real and per-
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ceived questions of security, people coming to Yale are likely to view Elm Ha-
ven as ideal housing.
The unknown variable is whether Yale University as an institution is will-
ing to facilitate this transformation. Currently, the Yale Gymnasium and Yale
parking lots create an impenetrable barrier separating Yale from all but one
isolated comer of Elm Haven. The chances of a redeveloped Elm Haven suc-
ceeding will be enhanced and may well depend on whether Elm Haven reaches
outward toward Yale as well as the Dixwell community, as opposed to inward,
blocked off from Yale. While the gym is not going to move, the parking lots
can. Walkways and green space can facilitate a sense of a transition from Elm
Haven to Yale and vice versa, as opposed to the current wall of separation.
In December 1996, Yale announced that it would build a new dormitory on
a parking lot next to the gym.313 It remains to be seen whether this project will
usher in a new integration with the community or serve as an additional barrier.
3. Legal Services-Throughout the history of the federally-funded Legal
Services Corporation, 314 there has been a conflict between a rhetoric of repre-
senting community interests315 and a practice devoted to individual rights, with
an emphasis on securing, preserving and asserting individual rights regardless
of larger effects on the community. This conflict between individual rights and
community is most dramatic when a legal service office defends the eviction of
housing project tenants who are adversely affecting their community, such as
drug dealers, regardless of community sentiment. More often than not, the de-
cision to defend an eviction in these cases is a choice to represent an individual
in direct opposition to the community.3 16
If legal services programs are to continue to be relevant in a world of ten-
ant management and limited equity ownership, legal services attorneys will
313. Patrick Dilger, Yale to Build Dorm Near Payne Whitney Gym, NEW HAVEN REG., Dec.
11, 1996, at A3.
314. See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1994)).
315. See JOHN A. DOOLEY & ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, LEGAL SERVICES HISTORY 1 (1985)
(noting that one of the basic tenets of the legal services movement was to have a presence in the
community, representing the community as a whole. Much of this rhetoric came from opponents
of legal services, who argued that legal services attorneys were more concerned with social engi-
neering than with providing individual services).
316. For discussion of tension between Legal Services attorneys and public housing officials
in New York City, see Deborah Marquardt, Running Drug Dealers Out of Public Housing, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1989, § 10 (Real Estate), at 7; Shawn G. Kennedy, Tenants Press for Easier Evic-
tion of Drug Dealers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1994, at BI. For a detailed discussion of Legal
Services attorneys' representation of drug dealers, see Robin S. Golden, Towards a Model of
Community Representation for Legal Assistance Lawyering: Examining the Role of Legal As-
sistance Agencies in Drug-Related Evictions from Public Housing (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the author). See also, Michael Powell, Red-Hot Texas Lawyer Hopes to Rescue Poor
From New York Liberals, THE N.Y. OBSERVER, Jan. 29, 1996.
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need to set priorities in their work in public housing based on community
needs, not individual rights. They will need to learn new skills in housing and
community economic development and represent tenant groups and commu-
nity development corporations. They will also need to learn the skills involved
in complex real estate transactions. There are few signs that legal services
programs are moving in this direction.
In private housing, legal services attorneys and housing advocates need to
base their policies on neighborhoods, not individuals. Recently, a colleague
and I were discussing an eviction in the Fair Haven section of New Haven, a
city with high vacancy rates. Although the client described her apartment as
being in decent condition, the city had condemned the building and was threat-
ening to arrest the client if she did not vacate immediately. This was an un-
usual circumstance, since condemnation required the city to pay the tenant
$4,000 in relocation benefits pursuant to the Uniform Relocation Assistance
Act.3 17 The client believed that the city had condemned the property not be-
cause the building was uninhabitable, but because the city wanted the property
to expand an adjacent parking lot. We decided to visit the apartment.
The building, a three-story structure, was the third building from the comer
of the block. The first two buildings were vacant and boarded up. On the
other side of the client's building, there was a small vacant lot. The next
building was also vacant and boarded up. While we did not see the inside of
the building, from the outside the building looked deteriorated, but structurally
sound other than the front porch, where the floor was rotting and in danger of
caving in. The housing on adjacent blocks was much better, and in some cases
looked new.
I asked my colleague if he would have agreed to defend this eviction had
he seen what we were viewing before he accepted the case. He told me that he
would not.
Is this an isolated case? I doubt it. In my experience, legal services offices
determine whether or not to defend evictions based on interviews, papers and
an intimate knowledge of esoteric landlord-tenant law, not on visits to or
knowledge of a neighborhood. This is a serious mistake. In a shrinking city
like New Haven, where deteriorating housing is in ample supply, most eviction
defenses provide the client with extra time to move from one substandard unit
to another. In many cases, the client could receive adequate time by appearing
pro se in an eviction proceeding and negotiating a settlement. The extra time
gained by a full-scale representation is a poor use of a limited resource and
shows a marked disregard of community priorities. Even worse, concentrating
on eviction defense as a priority regardless of neighborhood often perpetuates
slums under the guise of keeping clients in the only available housing. This is
not a sustainable housing policy.
317. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 8-266 to -282 (1989).
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A neighborhood-oriented policy requires that legal services attorneys know
and work in the neighborhoods, work with neighborhood groups, target par-
ticular landlords and be able to place a building within a neighborhood strat-
egy. An eviction defense has a strategic impact, with consequences for the
betterment or worsening of a neighborhood. To the extent that this is a war to
save neighborhoods, legal services lawyers are top-notch fighters who do not
necessarily know which side benefits from their victories. Too often, it is the
individual at the expense of the neighborhood.
4. Communitiarism-Bertha Gilkey is right when she identifies commu-
nity as an important component of Cochran Gardens' success. In the 60 Min-
utes segment, a tenant manager explained that the rules at Cochran Garden are
the same as in other housing authority projects; the difference is that in Co-
chran Gardens the rules are enforced. Too many projects are not policed, with
no sanction for serious misbehavior. Housing advocates give lip service to
tenant management and control, but place a premium on grievance procedures
and individuals rights. We cannot have it both ways. Housing advocates have
been too patronizing in determining what is best for public housing residents.
It is time for a policy which allows tenants to control regulations, policing,
management and evictions. Without that control, all talk about community is
illusory.
5. Integration and Mobility-The question of mobility is more complex
than most commentators acknowledge. While commentators praise vouchers
as a means for promulgating racial and economic integration and point to
Gatreaux-like programs, there is little information to support the proposition
that vouchers lead to a diaspora of the poor without massive intervention.
For the past ten years, Yale Law School's Landlord Tenant Clinic has pro-
vided eviction defense to New Haven tenants. The clients are referred by New
Haven Legal Assistance Association under federal eligibility guidelines, re-
quiring that each client meet strict financial eligibility guidelines of 125% of
poverty. The clients are overwhelmingly black. Many of the tenants have
vouchers.
Clients, students and faculty tend to live in different neighborhoods of
New Haven, segregated in a stark fashion by bright-line boundaries. When
students visit their clients, they are often appalled at the substandard condition
of the housing. Yet, as the students are quick to note, many of these tenants,
particularly those who have vouchers, pay higher rents than the students do,
even though the students obtain better housing in safer neighborhoods.
This is not an attempt to characterize this as a question of "choice," given
existing discrimination based on race, children and economic status. Still, after
representing over 1,000 clients in greater New Haven over the years, I am
struck by how tied clients are to their immediate neighborhoods, with a view of
housing opportunities extending only to a small section of the city. As for the
suburbs, my experience is that a poor, black New Haven family is more likely
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to move to South Carolina than to a white suburb surrounding New Haven, in
contrast to middle- and upper-class black families, which are likely to relocate
in the suburbs.
In pressing for increased use of mobility programs, Tegeler, Hanley, and
Liben fail to address questions of spacial equality, although they recognize that
"as housing mobility programs become more successful, policy makers may
need to examine, and possibly compensate for, the economic effects that sub-
urban mobility programs may have on city neighborhoods.
318
That statement implies "compensating" cities only after they have been
further damaged by declining population, which in turn will inevitably result in
declining neighborhoods. In public housing, departing tenants will leave local
housing authorities unable to manage their remaining stock. The problem is
that mobility programs will have a two-fold adverse effect on cities. Resources
will be diverted from cities and more and more people will leave. In New Ha-
ven and other cities, there is a remarkable confluence of abandoned buildings,
Section 8 and poverty. Section 8 tenants are the most stable and highest rent
payers in these neighborhoods. Relocating the Section 8 tenants is likely to
result in another abandoned building. Neighborhoods will worsen, thus accel-
erating the effect. Investment in mobility programs must be coordinated with
increased vigilance and increased investment in cities in order to achieve John
Calmore's spacial equality. Cities will continue to be defined by who is left
behind. City residents in public and private housing should be assured that we
are as concerned with their city as with the cities to which their neighbors have
chosen to relocate.
318. Tegeler, supra note 288, at 461 n.39.
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